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Abstract
We introduce a new class of bankruptcy problems in which the value of the estate is en-
dogenous and depends on agents’ investment decisions. There are two investment alternatives:
investing in a company and becoming a shareholder (risky asset) and depositing money into a
savings account (risk-free asset). Bankruptcy is a possible event only for the risky asset. We
deﬁne a game between agents each of which aims to maximize his expected payoﬀ by choosing an
investment alternative and a company management which aims to maximize proﬁts by choosing
a bankruptcy rule. There are two types of agents in our basic model, who are diﬀerentiated
by their incomes. We, ﬁrst, consider three well-known bankruptcy rules: the proportional rule,
the constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule. We show that there
always exists a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which involves the proportional
rule. This result is independent of the income distribution in the economy and holds even under
one-sided uncertainty on the income distribution. Moreover, if the company optimally chooses
the return rate to be paid to investors, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium involves
the proportional rule. We also extend our model in two dimensions: (i) to a larger set of rules
containing the Talmud rule and (ii) to two companies competing over potential investors.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
As early as 1985, Young argued that the incentives of agents should be incorporated into cost-
sharing models.1 He summarizes the motivation for this argument in the following passage:
"The problem with these approaches (ad-hoc cost sharing mechanisms) is that they ignore the
problem of motivation: why should a customer pay his allocated cost if it exceeds the beneﬁts or the
alternative cost of obtaining the service by some other means? This incentive argument is especially
critical in the case of voluntary association such as a club, a public consortium, or a cartel, where
the partners must ﬁrst agree in the manner of splitting the costs and beneﬁts before they can proceed
with the enterprise."
Thomson (2003) also addressed the need to combine noncooperative and market-based ap-
proaches to analyze bankruptcy problems in the following paragraph:
"An important question that we will not address is the extent to which the choice of particular
division rules aﬀects agents’ incentives to make commitments that one party may in the end be
unable to honor. In the context of bankruptcy, these are the incentives to loan and to borrow. In
many of the other applications, the parameters of the problems to be solved also result from decisions
that agents have made, and whatever rule is used at the division stage will in general have had an
eﬀect on these earlier choices. In order to handle these kinds of issues, we would need to embed
division rules in a more complete model in which risk-taking, eﬀort, and other variables chosen
by agents, such as lenders, borrowers, tax payers, government agencies and others, are explicitly
described, stochastic returns to economic activities are factored in, and so on."
In this paper, we introduce a new class of bankruptcy problems in which the value of the estate
is endogenous and depends on agents’ investment decisions that also determine their claims. Our
theoretical framework incorporates important economic factors such as the income distribution,
stochastic returns of risky investment projects, and the return on a risk-free outside option. Our
model is motivated by the following facts: (i) In bankruptcy situations, agents might act strategi-
cally and in line with their incentives, (ii) bankruptcy might occur following an investment decision
with stochastic outcomes, (iii) the choice of the bankruptcy rule and investment decisions have
impacts on each other through incentives, (iv) the claims distribution might have an impact on
agents’ decisions if there are peer eﬀects, and (v) many real bankruptcy situations involve payments
(to shareholders, lenders, partners etc.), which are not respected by the borrower.
In our base model, there are two investment alternatives: investing in a company and becoming
shareholder (risky asset) or depositing money into a savings account (risk-free asset). Bankruptcy
is a possible event only for the risky asset. We deﬁne a game between agents each of which aims to
maximize his expected payoﬀ by choosing an investment alternative and a company management
which aims to maximize the investment in the company by choosing a bankruptcy rule. This setup
is also in line with some recent suggestions in favor of a more liberal bankruptcy law, which would
provide a menu of rules and allows companies to choose one among them (see Hart, 2000). There are
two types of agents in the base model, who are diﬀerentiated by their incomes. We, ﬁrst, consider
three well-known bankruptcy rules: the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule and
the constrained equal losses rule. In the game, the company chooses the bankruptcy rule and later
1 I would like to thank Peyton Young for referring me to this paper.
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all agents simultaneously choose whether to invest in the risky asset (i.e., the project initiated by
the company) or the risk-free asset (savings account in a bank). Results in our base model provide
a noncooperative support for the proportional rule.2 In particular, we show that there always
exists a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that involves the proportional rule. This
statement is not valid for the constrained equal awards or the constrained equal losses rules. The
direct implication of this result is that the proportional rule never leads to an investment in the
company that is lower than the one under the constrained equal awards rule or the constrained
equal losses rule; and in some cases leads to an investment in the company strictly higher than
the one under the two rules. Moreover, the result supporting the proportional rule is independent
of the income distribution and holds even under one-sided uncertainty on the income distribution.
We obtain even a stronger result in favor of the proportional rule as we endogenize the return rate
to be paid to investors. In particular, if the company optimally chooses the return rate, the unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium involves the proportional rule. We also extend our base model
in two dimensions: (i) to a larger set of rules containing the Talmud rule, (ii) to two companies
competing over potential investors.
1.2 Overview of the Literature
The bankruptcy problem was ﬁrst introduced formally by O’Neill (1982). It describes a situation
in which there is a perfectly divisible estate to be allocated to a ﬁnite number of agents, whose
claims add up to an amount larger than the estate.3 A bankruptcy problem can be represented by a
claims vector and an estate. A bankruptcy rule is a function that associates a division of the estate
with every bankruptcy problem. Many real life situations such as distributing a will to inheritants,
liquidating the assets of a bankrupt company, rationing, taxation, and sharing the costs of a public
facility can be described using parsimonious bankruptcy models.
Following the introduction of the bankruptcy problem, most research on bankruptcy approaches
the problem from a normative (axiomatic) perspective and aims to compare diﬀerent rules by their
properties. As Thomson (2003) shows, this normative approach was successful in determining
strong contenders, i.e., a small set of bankruptcy rules with particularly desirable properties. The
most prominent rules are the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule, the constrained
equal losses rule and the Talmud rule. The proportional rule allocates the estate proportionally
with respect to claims. The constrained equal awards rule allocates the estate as equal as possible
taking claims as upper bounds and similarly the constrained equal losses rule allocates the shortage
of the estate in an equal way (shares bounded below by zero). The Talmud rule behaves like the
constrained equal awards rule when the estate is less than half of the total claims and like the
constrained equal losses rule when the estate is more than half of the total claims. These rules
will also be used in our research. For an extensive survey of the axiomatic literature, the reader is
referred to Moulin (2002) and Thomson (2003; 2006).
Some researchers (Yaari & Bar-Hillel, 1984; Moulin, 2000; and Herrero, Moreno-Ternero &
Ponti, 2010) oﬀer informal characterizations of diﬀerent circumstances in which a particular bank-
2For additional support for the proportional rule, we refer the reader to Chun (1988), Bergantiños & Sanchez
(2002), Chambers & Thomson (2002), Ching & Kakkar (2001), Chun & Lee (2007), De Frutos (1999), Gächter &
Riedl (2005; 2006), Hougaard & Østerdal (2005), Ju (2003), Ju, Miyagawa & Sakai (2007), and Moreno-Ternero
(2002; 2006; 2009).
3This corresponds to Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the US bankruptcy law.
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ruptcy rule is the most sensible one. Some examples are the use of the proportional rule in income
taxation and in the allocation of a bankrupt ﬁrm’s assets to shareholders, the constrained equal
losses rule in the provision of health services, and the constrained equal awards rule in the allocation
of a bankrupt bank’s assets to depositors.
Still another approach to bankruptcy problems is the game theoretical approach. There are
diﬀerent strands within the game theoretical approach to bankruptcy problems. Historically, the
ﬁrst one is the cooperative game theoretical approach. This approach transforms the bankruptcy
problem to a transferable utility game or a coalitional bargaining game and studies cooperative
solution concepts such as the core, the kernel etc.; Aumann & Maschler (1985), Young (1985),
Curiel, Maschler & Tijs (1987) and Dagan & Volij (1993) are some of the papers that apply the
cooperative game theoretical approach to analyze bankruptcy problems.
We know that incentives and strategic behavior play a signiﬁcant role in real-life bankruptcy
problems. Hence, the noncooperative game theoretical approach is also a natural and fruitful one.
The noncooperative game theoretical approach models the bankruptcy problem as a noncooperative
game among the claimants and studies equilibria of the game. This approach aims to provide a
noncooperative support for bankruptcy rules. There are, to the best of our knowledge, only a
few papers using this approach. O’Neill (1982), Chun (1989), Dagan, Serrano & Volij (1997),
Moreno-Ternero (2002), Herrero (2003), García-Jurado, González-Díaz & Villar (2006), Chang &
Hu (2008), Ashlagi, Karagözog˘lu & Klaus (2008), and Atlamaz, Berden, Peters & Vermeulen (2008)
apply the noncooperative game theoretical approach to analyze bankruptcy problems. Ching &
Kakkar (2001), Araujo & Páscoa (2002), and Ju & Karagözog˘lu (2009) approach the problem from
a slightly diﬀerent perspective by oﬀering market based formulations.
The major motivation of all these studies is that when the authority does not have a priori
preferences concerning the rule that will be implemented, it might resort to implementing a nonco-
operative game form (a set of rules or procedures) in which the strategic interactions of claimants
determine the rule to be used in equilibrium. Depending on the strategic game form the policymaker
implements, the resulting equilibrium rules may diﬀer as the studies mentioned above show.
The paper most closely related to ours is Kıbrıs & Kıbrıs (2008). They also analyze the in-
vestment implications of prominent bankruptcy rules. The major diﬀerences between our models
can be listed as: (i) in our model, the bankruptcy rule decision is embedded in a sequential game,
whereas in their paper compare investment volumes under diﬀerent bankruptcy rules are compared,
(ii) in our paper, agents invest either nothing or everything in the risky asset, whereas in their pa-
per agents solve an optimization problem to determine this investment amount, (iii) in our paper
results are valid for two types of agents, whereas in their paper, there are exactly two agents, (iv)
in our paper, agents are risk neutral and there is a risk-free outside option, whereas in their paper,
they allow for risk aversion and there is no outside option, and (v) we extend our model to contain
a larger set of rules and two competing companies. As a result of similarities between our base
models, some of our results are identical. For instance, in both papers, the proportional rule leads
to more investment than the constrained equal awards rule. One major diﬀerence between results
is that in our paper, the proportional rule leads to more investment than the constrained equal
losses rule, whereas in their paper, this is not always valid.
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1.3 Our Contribution
Contributions of our paper can be listed as: (a) endogenizing the determination of the bankruptcy
rule with a noncooperative procedure, (b) endogenizing the value of claims and the estate, (c)
incorporating the well-known bankruptcy model into a context that involves decision-making under
uncertainty and mimics a market environment, (d) oﬀering, at least, a partial explanation to a
real-life phenomenon, which is the use of the proportional rule in allocating a bankrupt company’s
assets to shareholders, and (e) providing a noncooperative framework in which the bankruptcy
rule decision depends on both borrowers’ (companies’) and lenders (agents’) incentives. Firstly,
endogenously determined bankruptcy rules, claims and estates are new in the literature. In most
of the papers on bankruptcy, the analysis is based on exogenously ﬁxed bankruptcy rules, claims
and estates. In real life, obviously agents’ decisions and hence the value of claims and the estate
depend on the bankruptcy rule and the choice of the bankruptcy rule depends, in turn, on agents’
actions. Thus, the bankruptcy rule, claims and estate are all endogenously determined. Secondly,
many real life instances that involve a bankruptcy problem also involve an investment decision
under uncertainty. In our paper, we model the whole investment process at an earlier stage, i.e.
before bankruptcy is realized.4 With this approach, we also incorporate factors that play important
roles in real-life bankruptcy problems such as stochastic returns, risk, attitudes towards risk and
income distribution into the bankruptcy problem. Our model gives, at least, a partial explanation
for the popular use of the proportional rule in the liquidation process of a bankrupt company (i.e.,
its use in each priority class in sequential priority rules employed by many bankruptcy laws such
as Chapter 11 of the US bankruptcy law). Finally, in all bankruptcy papers with noncooperative
approaches, the strategic interaction takes place among claimants, whereas the bankruptcy rule
decision is inﬂuenced by both lenders’ and borrower’s interests in our paper. It is determined as a
result of a sequential game played among the lenders and borrowers. Hence, our paper is the ﬁrst
one that incorporate both lenders (potential claimants) and borrowers into a bankruptcy problem.
1.4 Road Map
The organization of the paper is as follows: We ﬁrst introduce the standard bankruptcy problem
and the bankruptcy rules that we employ in this paper and provide some preparatory results in
Section 2. In Section 3, we introduce the strategic model of bankruptcy under uncertainty and the
bankruptcy problem with an endogenous estate. In Section 4 and its subsections, we analyze the
equilibria of the bankruptcy game introduced in Section 3. Section 5 provides two extension results.
Section 6 contains comparative static analyses on risk-return and income distribution parameters.
In Section 7, we discuss our assumptions, results, and future research on the topic. Finally, Section
8 concludes.
2 Bankruptcy Problems and Rules
Bankruptcy is typically deﬁned as a situation in which the total claims of claimants exceed the
size of the available estate. It is sometimes also referred to as the conﬂicting claims problem.
4 In fact, in our model, bankruptcy might not occur. It is the possibility of bankruptcy on which company’s and
agents’ decisions are based.
5
Formally, a bankruptcy problem is represented by a set of claimants N = {1, 2, ..., n}, a claims
vector C = (c1, c2, ..., cn) and for all i ∈ N , ci ∈ R++, an estate E ∈ R++ to be divided among the
claimants and the inequality
∑
i∈N ci > E. We denote the set of all such bankruptcy problems
(C,E) by B.
A bankruptcy rule is a mechanism that allocates the estate to claimants given any bankruptcy
problem. Formally, a bankruptcy rule F is a function mapping each bankruptcy problem (C,E) ∈ B
into Rn+ such that for all i ∈ N , Fi(C,E) ∈ [0, ci] and
∑
i∈N Fi(C,E) = E. Below, we deﬁne the
bankruptcy rules we use in our base model.
The proportional rule allocates the estate proportionally with respect to claims.
Deﬁnition 1 (Proportional Rule) For all (C,E) ∈ B, we have P (C,E) ≡ λpC, where λp is
given by λp = (E/
∑
i∈N ci).
The constrained equal awards rule allocates the estate as equal as possible taking claims as
upper bounds.
Deﬁnition 2 (Constrained Equal Awards Rule) For all (C,E) ∈ B, and all j ∈ N , we have
CEAj(C,E) ≡ min{cj , λcea}, where λcea solves
∑
i∈N min{ci, λcea} = E.
The constrained equal losses rule allocates the shortage of the estate (i.e., the total loss due to
bankruptcy) in an equal way (shares bounded below by zero).
Deﬁnition 3 (Constrained Equal Losses Rule) For all (C,E) ∈ B, and all j ∈ N , we have
CELj(C,E) ≡ max{0, cj − λcel}, where λcel solves
∑
i∈N max{0, ci − λcel} = E.
Example 1 N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, C = (10, 30, 40, 70, 100) and E = 180.
agent 1 2 3 4 5
claim 10 30 40 70 100
P 7.2 21.6 28.8 50.4 72
CEA 10 30 40 50 50
CEL 0 15 25 55 85
Note that under the constrained equal awards rule, claimants 1,2, and 3 receive strictly more
than what they would receive under the proportional rule, whereas claimants 4 and 5 receive strictly
less than what they would receive under the proportional rule. Loosely speaking, the constrained
equal awards rule favors small claimants (i.e., it makes transfers from bigger claimants to smaller
claimants). Also note that under the constrained equal losses rule, claimants 4 and 5 receive
strictly more than what they would receive under the proportional rule whereas claimants 1,2, and
3 receive strictly less than what they would receive under the proportional rule. Loosely speaking,
the constrained equal losses rule favors big claimants (i.e., it makes transfers from smaller claimants
to bigger claimants). Later, we will make use of these facts in our analysis.
Below we prove a lemma that formalizes the idea of inter-claimant transfers under the con-
strained equal awards and the constrained equal losses rules taking the proportional rule payoﬀs as
basis.
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Lemma 1 Let (C,E) ∈ B. Assume without loss of generality that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ... ≤ cn. Then,
(i) there exists a critical level of claims, c∗ such that for all i ∈ N with ci < c∗, CEAi(C,E) >
Pi(C,E) and for all i ∈ N with ci ≥ c∗, CEAi(C,E) ≤ Pi(C,E) and,
(ii) there exists a critical level of claims, c˜ such that for all i ∈ N with ci < c˜, CELi(C,E) <
Pi(C,E) and for all i ∈ N with ci ≥ c˜, CELi(C,E) ≥ Pi(C,E).
Proof. See Appendix B.
In Lemma 1, for a bankruptcy rule F ∈ {CEA,CEL} and an agent i ∈ N, we provided some
results on Fi(C,E)−Pi(C,E). From now on, for all F ∈ {P,CEA,CEL}, we will denote the transfer
from agent i to other agents (taking the proportional payoﬀ vector as the reference point) under
rule F in the bankruptcy problem (C,E) by Si(C,E, F ). Hence, Si(C,E, F ) = Fi(C,E)−Pi(C,E).
The following lemma provides closed form expressions for transfers under CEA and CEL in the
model with two types of agents (see Section 3), where agents’ types refer to their claims. In the
model, we denote the transfer of agent i of type t by St(C,E, F ) since, by the deﬁnitions of all
bankruptcy rules F ∈ {P,CEA,CEL}, transfers will be equal to St(C,E, F ), for all agents i of
type t.
Lemma 2 Let (C,E) ∈ B and let Nh (Nl) denote the non-empty set of claimants each with a claim
ch (cl), with cardinality nh (nl). Assume that 0 < cl < ch. Denote the set of all claimants by N
with cardinality n = nh + nl. Then the following statements are valid.
(a-1) If ch > cl > λcea, then
(a-1-1) Sl(C,E,CEA) =
nhE[ch−cl]
[nh+nl][nhch+nlcl]
> 0 and
(a-1-2) Sh(C,E,CEA) =
nlE[cl−ch]
[nh+nl][nhch+nlcl]
< 0.
(a-2) If ch > λcea ≥ cl, then
(a-2-1) Sl(C,E,CEA) =
cl[nhch+nlcl−E]
[nhch+nlcl]
> 0 and
(a-2-2) Sh(C,E,CEA) =
nlcl[E−nhch−nlcl]
nh[nhch+nlcl]
< 0.
(b-1) If ch > cl > λcel, then
(b-1-1) Sl(C,E,CEL) =
nh[cl−ch][nhch+nlcl−E]
[nh+nl][nhch+nlcl]
< 0 and
(b-1-2) Sh(C,E,CEL) =
nl[ch−cl][nhch+nlcl−E]
[nh+nl][nhch+nlcl]
> 0.
(b-2) If ch > λcel ≥ cl, then
(b-2-1) Sl(C,E,CEL) = − Enhch+nlcl cl < 0 and
(b-2-2) Sh(C,E,CEL) = nlnh
Ecl
[nhch+nlcl]
> 0.
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Proof. See Appendix B.
Note that for all F ∈ {P,CEA,CEL}, nhSh(C,E, F )+nlSl(C,E, F ) = 0. Hence, the transfers
are balanced. This is implied by the eﬃciency property embedded in the deﬁnition of a bankruptcy
rule. Note that the reason why we state the results in Lemma 2 for two types is because we have
two types of agents in our base model. Results in Lemma 2 can be generalized to any ﬁnite number
of types. Below, we introduce our base model of bankruptcy with an endogeonus estate.
3 A Strategic Model of Bankruptcy with an Endogenous Estate
There are nh agents each with income wh and nl agents each with income wl, such that 0 <
wl < wh.5 Accordingly, Nh is the set of type h agents with |Nh| = nh and Nl is the set of type
l agents with |Nl| = nl. We use t to refer to a generic type i.e., t ∈ {l, h}. Therefore, for all
agents i ∈ Nl ∪Nh, individual income wi ∈ {wl, wh}. Both types of agents are risk-neutral. Hence,
each agent wants to choose the investment alternative that brings the maximum expected return.
There are two investment alternatives: agents either invest in a company and become shareholders
or deposit their money into a savings account in a bank. The company runs a risky investment
project and depositing money into a bank, on the other hand, brings a risk-free return. The state
space for the outcome of the risky investment project is Ω = {s, f} where s represents success and
f represents failure. Hence, the outcome of the project is a random variable ω. With probability
Pr(ω = s) = πs < 1, the investment project is successful and brings a payoﬀ of 0 < rs ≤ 1 to the
company; with probability Pr(ω = f) = 1 − πs, the investment project fails and brings a payoﬀ
of rf < rs ≤ 1 to the company. The company promises to pay r to the depositors, which satisﬁes
0 ≤ rf < r ≤ rs ≤ 1.6 However, if the project fails it cannot honor all claims since rf < r. On
the other hand, the savings account at the bank pays a constant return r.7 We eliminate two cases
that would lead to trivial results: rf > r and r > r. If rf > r was the case, then no agent would
prefer to deposit their money to the bank and if r > r was the case, then no agent would prefer
to invest in the company. Hence, to make the problem "interesting", we assume that rf < r < r.
Thus, the risky asset oﬀers a higher return in the case of success, but a lower return in the case of
failure (bankruptcy).8 Having introduced the necessary parameters, now we deﬁne the particular
class of bankruptcy problems we analyze.
Deﬁnition 4 A bankruptcy problem with an endogenous estate is a pair (C,E), where C is a claims
vector with entries ci = (1 + r)wi for all i ∈ N and E = (1 + rf )
∑
i∈N wi is the estate. The class
of bankruptcy problems with an endogenous estate is denoted by B˜.
The endogeneity is due to the fact that the claims vector and the estate are determined by agents’
decisions. Moreover, note that C and E in the deﬁnition of the bankruptcy problem are derived
5 In fact, what we mean by wt is the part of the income that is reserved for investment by a type t agent.
6r is not determined as a result of an optimization problem in our base model. Nevertheless, later we endogenize
r by incorporating it into company’s optimization problem.
7An asset with a variable return and a lower risk compared to the investment in the company would also do.
Results in the paper are valid with such an asset. We assumed a risk-free asset for expositional simplicity.
8We will use investing in the risky asset versus investing in the company interchangeably; and investing in the
risk-free asset versus depositing money into the bank interchangeably.
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from w, rf , and r. Hence, the data of the problem can be written as (w, rf , r) instead of (C,E).
However, to keep the exposition similar to the one in standard bankruptcy problems, we keep the
(C,E) notation. Our analysis will focus on the class of bankruptcy problems with an endogenous
estate, unless otherwise stated. All parameters mentioned above are common knowledge. Obviously,
bankruptcy is a possible event only for the ﬁrst investment alternative.
The company, m, is an important player. It chooses a bankruptcy rule F , which will be imple-
mented in case of bankruptcy. The company’s objective is to maximize the investment attracted.
Note that, given r, rs, rf , r and πs, maximizing the investment volume is identical to maximizing
the proﬁt. The bankruptcy rule chosen aﬀects agents’ investment decisions since it aﬀects their
return in case of a bankruptcy. Hence, the company takes into account the possible actions of
agents while choosing the bankruptcy rule. As mentioned before, we use the proportional rule, the
constrained equal awards rule, and the constrained equal losses rule as benchmarks. Accordingly,
the company’s strategy space is denoted by ψm = {P,CEA,CEL}. The company’s decision is
observed by all agents. Hence, each decision of the company starts a proper subgame to be played
by agents. We denote these three subgames by ΓP , ΓCEA, and ΓCEL.
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


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





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Figure 1: Game Tree
Knowing which bankruptcy rule F is chosen by m, in the subgame ΓF , all agents i ∈ Nl ∪Nh
choose whether to invest their money in the risky asset (i.e., playing in) or to invest in the risk-
free, outside asset (i.e., playing out). This decision is made by all agents simultaneously. For all
i ∈ Nl ∪Nh, we denote agent i’s actions by ai ∈ {in, out} and the actions taken by agent i under
rule F ∈ {P,CEA,CEL} as ai,F . We describe what each agent i would do in each subgame ΓF by
agent i’s strategy, which is denoted by si ∈ ψi. Agent i’s strategy space, ψi, can be written as
ψi = {(ai,P , ai,CEA, ai,CEL) | ai,F ∈ {in, out} and F ∈ {P,CEA,CEL}}. (1)
The company’s payoﬀ function is linear and we denote it as Vm(F ) =
∑
t∈{l,h} nt,in(F )wt, where
nt,in(F ) stands for the number of type t agents who play in in the subgame ΓF . Therefore, we can
write the company’s objective to maximize the investment as
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max
F∈{P,CEA,CEL}
Vm(F ). (2)
Note that once r and rf are ﬁxed, the estate E and the claims vector C are both determined by
agents’ actions. Since agent i’s payoﬀ under bankruptcy is determined by F , nh,in and nl,in, when
writing agents’ payoﬀs under bankruptcy, we employ the notation, Vi,in(F, nh,in, nl,in). Similarly,
agent i’s transfer under rule F can be written as Si(F, nh,in, nl,in).
Now, given agent i’s action in ΓF , the payoﬀ of agent i ∈ Nl ∪Nh can be written as
Vi(F, ai,F ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
Vi,out = (1 + r)wi, if ai,F = out
V ei,in(F, nh,in, nl,in) = πs(1 + r)wi + (1− πs)[Vi,in(P, nh,in, nl,in)
+Si(F, nh,in, nl,in)], if ai,F = in
(3)
where the superscript e refers to the expected value.9 Notice that the ﬁrst part of V ei,in(F, nh,in, nl,in)
is agent i’s payoﬀ in case of successful completion of the project and the second part is his payoﬀ in
case of a bankruptcy. Also note that for the proportional rule, for all i ∈ Nl∪Nh, Si(P, nh,in, nl,in) =
0.
The following lemma enables us to simplify the notation Vj,in(P, nh,in, nl,in), since it shows
that the payoﬀ each agent receives under P is independent from other agents’ types, actions, etc.
Consequently, we can write the payoﬀ of agent j under the proportional rule as Pj .
Lemma 3 Assume that for all j ∈ Nl ∪Nh, the claim structure is cj = (1+ r)wj and the estate is
E = (1 + rf )
∑
i∈Nl∪Nh wi. Then Vj,in(P, nh,in, nl,in) ≡ Pj = (1 + rf )wj.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The result above is valid for any ﬁnite number of types. By Lemma 3, if agent i is of type t,
then Vi,in(P, nh,in, nl,in) = (1 + rf )wt. We rewrite agent i’s expected payoﬀ under P as
P ei = πs(1 + r)wi + (1− πs)Pi. (4)
Using the expected payoﬀ under the proportional rule, we can rewrite agent i’s expected payoﬀ
under CEA as
V ei,in(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) = πs(1 + r)wi + (1− πs)[Pi + Si(CEA, nh,in, nl,in)]
= P ei + (1− πs)Si(CEA, nh,in, nl,in), (5)
where P ei stands for the expected payoﬀ that agent i would get under the proportional rule and
Si(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) is the transfer that agent i makes/receives under CEA when nh,in type h
agents and nl,in type l agents play in. Similarly, under CEL, the expected payoﬀ of agent i can be
rewritten as
V ei,in(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) = πs(1 + r)wi + (1− πs)[Pi + Si(CEL, nh,in, nl,in)]
= P ei + (1− πs)Si(CEL, nh,in, nl,in), (6)
9As one can see in (3), in deﬁning agents’ payoﬀs from playing in in case of bankruptcy, we use the proportional
rule payoﬀ as a benchmark.
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where Si(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) is the transfer that agent i makes/receives under CEL when nh,in type
h agents and nl,in type l agents play in.
Table 1 below, together with the sequence of actions described before and summarized in Figure
1, deﬁnes the sequential game Γ with three proper subgames ΓP ,ΓCEA, and ΓCEL:
Players {m} ∪Nl ∪Nh
Strategies ψm ×
∏
i∈Nl∪Nh
ψi
Payoﬀs (Vm(F ), (Vi,si(F, s−i)), i ∈ Nl ∪Nh
Table 1: Sequential Game Γ
where s−i denotes all agents’ strategies except agent i. We look for pure strategy equilibria of
this game. Since we want to capture sequential rationality, the equilibrium concept that we employ
is that of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
4 Analysis of Equilibrium Decisions
Now, we analyze the equilibria of the game deﬁned above. We start the analysis in a backward
induction fashion with the subgames ΓF ∈ {ΓP ,ΓCEA,ΓCEL} played among all agents i ∈ Nl ∪Nh.
Therefore, in the following, when we use the term "equilibrium", it refers to the agents’ equilibrium
actions in the corresponding subgame. After analyzing agents’ behavior in each subgame, we
analyze the company’s action in equilibrium. This is followed by the description of all equilibria of
the game along with the resulting investment in the company.
Before the analysis of agents’ investment decisions in equilibrium, we prove some preparatory
lemmas and corollaries. The following corollary provides values of c∗ and c˜ in the class of bankruptcy
problems with endogenous estates. The following result provides closed form expressions for c∗ and
c˜ in this class. It follows from the proof of Lemma 1. Recall that for all i ∈ N , wi ∈ {wl, wh},
where 0 < wl < wh and |N | = n = nh + nl. Moreover, nin refers to total number of agents who
invest in the company.
Corollary 1 Let (C,E) ∈ B˜. Then,
(i) c∗ = nh,innin−nl,in (1 + r)wh −
nl,in
nin−nl,in
(1+r)(r−rf )
(1+rf )
wl and
(ii) c˜ = nh,innin−nl,in (1 + r)wh −
nl,in
nin−nl,in
(1+r)(1+rf )
(r−rf ) wl.
Proof. Recall formulas (14) and (15) from the proof of Lemma 1. If we plug into (14) and (15)
(1 + rf )(nh,inwh + nl,inwl) for E,
(1 + r)wi for ci, and
(1 + r)(nh,inwh + nl,inwl) for
∑
i∈N ci,
then we obtain the equations in (i) and (ii).
The following corollary of Lemma 2 derives closed form functions of transfers under CEA and
CEL.
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Corollary 2 Let (C,E) ∈ B˜.
(a-1) If ch > cl > λcea, then
(a-1-1) Sl(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) =
nh,in
nh,in+nl,in
[(1 + rf )(wh − wl)] ≥ 0 and
(a-1-2) Sh(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) =
nl,in
nh,in+nl,in
[(1 + rf )(wl − wh)] ≤ 0.
(a-2) If ch > λcea ≥ cl, then
(a-2-1) Sl(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) = (r − rf )wl > 0 and
(a-2-2) Sh(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) =
nl,in
nh,in
(rf − r)wl ≤ 0.
(b-1) If ch > cl > λcel, then
(b-1-1) Sl(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) =
nh,in
nh,in+nl,in
[(r − rf )(wl − wh)] ≤ 0 and
(b-1-2) Sh(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) =
nl,in
nh,in+nl,in
[(r − rf )(wh − wl)] ≥ 0.
(b-2) If ch > λcel ≥ cl, then
(b-2-1) Sl(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) = −(1 + rf )wl < 0 and
(b-2-2) Sh(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) =
nl,in
nh,in
(1 + rf )wl ≥ 0.
Proof. Recall the formulas we derived in the proof of Lemma 2. If we plug into those formulas for
all t ∈ {l, h},
(1 + r)wt for ct,
nt,in for nt, and
(1 + rf )[nl,inwl + nh,inwh] for E,
then we obtain the result.
The following lemma shows that c∗ and c˜ are always between cl and ch.
Lemma 4 Let (C,E) ∈ B˜. Assume that nh,in > 0 and nl,in > 0. Then, for all nh,in and nl,in, (i)
cl ≤ c∗ ≤ ch and (ii) cl ≤ c˜ ≤ ch.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Since if one type is making transfers the other type should be receiving transfers in the case
with two types, the result mentioned in Lemma 4 is intuitive. This result is required for the
comparative static analyses we conduct in the following lemma. It ensures that when the number
of type t ∈ {l, h} agents changes, the identity of the type making transfers and the identity of the
type receiving transfers stays the same.
Lemma 5 Let (C,E) ∈ B˜. Then,
(i) an increase in nl,in weakly decreases Sl(CEA, nh,in, nl,in),
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(ii) an increase in nl,in strictly increases Sh(CEA, nh,in, nl,in),
(iii) an increase in nh,in weakly increases Sl(CEL, nh,in, nl,in),
(iv) an increase in nh,in strictly decreases Sh(CEL, nh,in, nl,in),
(v) an increase in nh,in weakly increases Sl(CEA, nh,in, nl,in),
(vi) an increase in nh,in strictly decreases Sh(CEA, nh,in, nl,in),
(vii) an increase in nl,in weakly decreases Sl(CEL, nh,in, nl,in), and
(viii) an increase in nl,in strictly increases Sh(CEL, nh,in, nl,in).
Proof. See Appendix B.
The comparative statics stated in Lemma 5 have simple intuitions. In a nutshell, they show
the changes in per-capita transfer with respect to changes in the number of type h and type l
agents. We see that if the number of agents of types who are making transfers increases, per-capita
transfers they make decrease and per-capita transfers other types receive increase. On the other
hand, if the number of agents of types who are receiving transfers increases, per-capita transfers
they receive decrease and per-capita transfers other types make increase. The following lemma
states that under P , a type l agent prefers to play in if and only if a type h agent prefers to play
in.
Lemma 6 Given a bankruptcy problem (C,E) ∈ B˜, Ph ≥ Vh if and only if Pl ≥ Vl.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Tie-Breaking Assumption Every agent plays in when he is indiﬀerent between in and out.
This tie-breaking assumption is employed in the rest of the paper. The following lemma states
that each agent’s decision in equilibrium is determined by his type only.
Lemma 7 (Symmetry) If agents i and j are of the same type t ∈ {l, h}, their strategies are the
same in equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 7 has three important implications. First of all, it shows that if there exists an equilib-
rium it will be symmetric, i.e., same types play the same strategy in equilibrium. The tie-breaking
assumption is important for the validity of Lemma 7. If agents of the same type play strategies
that are diﬀerent from each other when these agents are indiﬀerent, the statement in Lemma 7 is
not valid anymore. However, breaking the ties in favor of playing in is not crucial for the proofs.
Assuming that every agent plays out when he is indiﬀerent would work equally well.
Second, this symmetry result enables us to employ a more compact notation for equilibrium
actions in subgames ΓF (in game Γ): (ah,F , al,F ) means that all type h agents play ah,F and all
type l agents play al,F in the subgame ΓF .
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Third, this result also enables us to use a simpler notation when writing agents’ expected payoﬀs.
Since we know that agents of the same type act identically, we can write the expected payoﬀ of a
representative type t agent who plays in under rule F as V et (F, s−t) instead of writing individual
expected payoﬀ as V ei,in(F, nh,in, nl,in).
10 We will employ this notation in the remaining part of the
model.
The following corollary relates the symmetry result to the equilibrium values of Vm(F ). Since
we show that agents of the same type have the same strategies in equilibrium, this reduces the
number of possible values of equilibrium investment volume.
Corollary 3 In equilibrium, Vm(F ) can take only four values: 0, nhwh, nlwl and nhwh + nlwl.
Proof. Since there are two types of agents, by Lemma 7, there are four possible combinations of
strategy proﬁles under the symmetry result proven above:
(i) Both types play out. Thus, Vm(F ) = 0,
(ii) Type h agents play in, type l agents play out. Thus, Vm(F ) = nhwh,
(iii) Type h agents play out, type l agents play in. Thus, Vm(F ) = nlwl,
(iv) Both types play in. Thus, Vm(F ) = nhwh + nlwl.
The following lemma shows that certain strategy proﬁles cannot exist in any equilibrium under
CEA and CEL.
Lemma 8 The following statements about strategy proﬁles are valid.
(i) In the subgame ΓCEA, the strategy proﬁle (for all i ∈ Nh, si = (., in, .) and for all j ∈ Nl,
sj = (., out, .) cannot be an equilibrium,
(ii) In the subgame ΓCEL, the strategy proﬁle (for all i ∈ Nh, si = (., ., out) and for all j ∈ Nl,
sj = (., ., in) cannot be an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The result in this lemma has a simple intuition: if, in equilibrium, the parameter values are
such that even the type of agents who are making transfers ﬁnd playing in optimal, the type of
agents who are receiving transfers also ﬁnd it optimal to play in.
4.1 Characterization of All Nash Equilibria in ΓP , ΓCEA, and ΓCEL
In this subsection, we describe agents’ investment behavior and characterize all Nash equilibria in
subgames ΓP , ΓCEA, and ΓCEL. Recall that Lemma 7 enables us to use type best responses instead
of agent best responses. Hence, in this section, we use type t’s best response to a strategy played
by the other type. Denote the best response of type t agents to action a−t played by the other type
of agents in the subgame ΓF by BRt(F, a−t).11
10The equal treatment of equals property asserts that the agents with equal claims should receive the same payoﬀ.
This property is satisﬁed by all rules we consider here, which enables us to use this compact notation.
11Also note that each agent has one information set in each subgame and two actions. Therefore, the terms strategy
and action refer to same objects in subgames ΓP , ΓCEA, and ΓCEL. Hence, we prefer to stick to action notation
instead of introducing strategy notation for subgames, although we use the terms strategy and action interchangeably.
14
Under the Proportional Rule:
In the subgame ΓP , the following payoﬀ matrix can be used to show representative type h and
type l agent’s expected payoﬀs. The ﬁrst (second) item in each cell represents each type h (type l)
agent’s expected payoﬀ. All matrices are drawn for representative agents of type h and type l.
h \ l in out
in P eh , P
e
l P
e
h , Vl,out
out Vh,out, P
e
l Vh,out, Vl,out
Table 2: Payoﬀ Matrix under the Proportional Rule
Recall that by Lemma 3, the expected payoﬀ of each agent is independent of other agents’
strategies under P . This implies that all equilibria are dominant strategy equilibria. Also, remem-
ber that by Lemma 6, P el < Vl,out if and only if P
e
h < Vh,out. Therefore, if P
e
h ≥ Vh,out, then
BRh(P, in) = BRh(P, out) = in, and similarly if P el ≥ Vl,out, then BRl(P, in) = BRl(P, out) = in.
If P eh < Vh,out, then BRh(P, in) = BRh(P, out) = out, and similarly if P
e
l < Vl,out, then
BRl(P, in) = BRl(P, out) = out. Also recall that (ah,F , al,F ) means that all type h agents play ah,F
and all type l agents play al,F in the subgame ΓF . We now describe agents’ equilibrium strategies
in the subgame ΓP .
Equilibria in the subgame ΓP :
Case 1 If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et < Vt,out, then the unique equilibrium strategy proﬁle is (ah,P , al,P ) =
(out, out).
Case 2 If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et ≥ Vt,out, then the unique equilibrium strategy proﬁle is (ah,P , al,P ) =
(in, in).
Note that neither (in, out) nor (out, in) equilibria are possible. This is due to proportionality,
which implies that P eh ≥ Vh,out if and only if P el ≥ Vl,out.
Under the Constrained Equal Awards Rule:
In the subgame ΓCEA:
h \ l in out
in
P eh + (1− πs)Sh(CEA, in),
P el + (1− πs)Sl(CEA, in)
P eh , Vl,out
out Vh,out, P
e
l Vh,out, Vl,out
Table 3: Payoﬀ Matrix under the Constrained Equal Awards Rule
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By the deﬁnition of the constrained equal awards rule and Lemma 1, Sh(CEA, in) < 0 and
Sl(CEA, in) > 0. If the outside asset pays more than the best possible expected payoﬀ that
type l agents can get, the analysis is trivial since then type l agents would never play in. Hence,
we assume that V el (CEA, in) = P
e
l + (1 − πs)Sl(CEA, in) > Vl,out. This assumption implies
that BRl(CEA, in) = in. The relationship between P el and Vl,out determines type l agents’ best
response to type h agents playing out. If P el ≥ Vl, then BRl(CEA, out) = in; if Pl < Vl,out,
then BRl(CEA, out) = out. On the other hand, type h’s best response against in depends on the
relationship between V eh (CEA, in) = P
e
h + (1− πs)Sh(CEA, in) and Vh,out. If
V eh (CEA, in) = P
e
h + (1− πs)Sh(CEA, in) ≥ Vh,out,
then BRh(CEA, in) = in; if
V eh (CEA, in) = P
e
h + (1− πs)Sh(CEA, in) < Vh,out,
then BRh(CEA, in) = out. Therefore, these inequalities characterize agents’ equilibrium strategies
in the subgame ΓCEA.
Equilibria in the subgame ΓCEA:
Case 1 If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et < Vt,out, then the unique equilibrium strategy proﬁle is
(ah,CEA, al,CEA) = (out, out).
Case 2 If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et ≥ Vt,out and V eh (CEA, in) = P eh + (1 − πs)Sh(CEA, in) < Vh,out,
then the unique equilibrium strategy proﬁle is (ah,CEA, al,CEA) = (out, in).
Case 3 If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et ≥ Vt,out and V eh (CEA, in) = P eh + (1 − πs)Sh(CEA, in) ≥ Vh,out,
then the unique equilibrium strategy proﬁle is (ah,CEA, al,CEA) = (in, in).
Under the Constrained Equal Losses Rule:
In the subgame ΓCEL:
h \ l in out
in
P eh + (1− πs)Sh(CEL, in),
P el + (1− πs)Sl(CEL, in)
P eh , Vl,out
out Vh,out, P
e
l Vh,out, Vl,out
Table 4: Payoﬀ Matrix under the Constrained Equal Losses Rule
By the deﬁnition of the constrained equal losses rule and Lemma 1, Sh(CEL, in) > 0 and
Sl(CEL, in) < 0. If the outside asset pays more than the best possible expected payoﬀ that type
h agents can get, the analysis is trivial since then type h agents would never play in. Hence,
we assume that V eh (CEL, in) = P
e
h + (1 − πs)Sh(CEL, in) > Vh,out. This assumption implies
that BRh(CEL, in) = in. The relationship between P eh and Vh,out determines type h agents’ best
response to type l agents playing out. If P eh ≥ Vh, then BRh(CEL, out) = in; if Ph < Vh,out, then
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BRh(CEL, out) = out. On the other hand, type l’s best response to type h agents playing in
depends on the relationship between V el (CEL, in) = P
e
l + (1− πs)Sl(CEL, in) and Vl,out. If
V el (CEL, in) = P
e
l + (1− πs)Sl(CEL, in) ≥ Vl,out,
then BRl(CEL, in) = in; if
V el (CEL, in) = P
e
l + (1− πs)Sl(CEL, in) < Vl,out,
then BRl(CEL, in) = out. Therefore, these inequalities characterize agents’ equilibrium actions
under the constrained equal losses rule.
Equilibria in the subgame ΓCEL:
Case 1 If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et < Vt,out, then the unique equilibrium strategy proﬁle is
(ah,CEL, al,CEL) = (out, out).
Case 2 If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et ≥ Vt,out and V el (CEL, in) = P el + (1 − πs)Sl(CEL, in) < Vl,out,
then the unique equilibrium strategy proﬁle is (ah,CEL, al,CEL) = (in, out).
Case 3 If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et ≥ Vt,out and V el (CEL, in) = P el + (1 − πs)Sl(CEL, in) ≥ Vl,out,
then the unique equilibrium strategy proﬁle is (ah,CEL, al,CEL) = (in, in).
Note that in a Nash equilibrium of the subgame ΓCEA, if type h agents choose to play in, type
l agents also choose to play in. Similarly, in a Nash equilibrium of the subgame ΓCEL, if type l
agents choose to play in, type h agents also choose to play in. Also note that, if the equilibrium
of the subgame ΓP is the strategy proﬁle (ah,P , al,P ) = (out, out), then the equilibrium strategy
proﬁles of the subgames ΓCEA and ΓCEL are also (ah,CEA, al,CEA) = (ah,CEL, al,CEL) = (out, out).
4.2 Characterization of All Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in Γ
Having ﬁnished analyzing agents’ behavior in all three subgames, we analyze the company’s behav-
ior and characterize all subgame perfect Nash equilibria in Γ in this subsection. As we mentioned
in Section 3, the company’s payoﬀ function is Vm(F ) =
∑
t∈{l,h} nt,in(F )wt where nt,in(F ) is the
number of type t agents played in under F . Therefore, the company’s decision depends on the
equilibrium strategies of agents in each subgame and the resulting level of investment. In the pre-
vious section, we analyzed the equilibrium strategies of agents in all three subgames. Below, we list
diﬀerent combinations of inequalities and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁles
along with the equilibrium investment in the company. In the strategy proﬁle (sm, sh, sl), the ﬁrst
entry refers to the company’s strategy (i.e., sm ∈ ψm) , second to type h agents’ (i.e., sh ∈ ψh), and
third to type l agents’ (i.e., sl ∈ ψl). Moreover, the ﬁrst entry in a representative type t agent’s
strategy proﬁle refer to his equilibrium action in ΓP , the second to his equilibrium action in ΓCEA,
and the third to his equilibrium action in ΓCEL.
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C1. If for all t ∈ {l, h}
P et ≥ Vt,out,
P eh + (1− πs)Sh(CEA, in) < Vh,out, and
P el + (1− πs)Sl(CEL, in) < Vl,out,
then given the agents’ equilibrium actions in subgames ΓP , ΓCEA, and ΓCEL presented in the
previous subsection, the company prefers the proportional rule and the equilibrium investment
in the company is Vm(F ) =
∑
t∈{l,h} ntwt. As we showed in the previous subsection, under
these parameter restrictions, neither the constrained equal awards rule nor the constrained
equal losses rule can attract all types to invest in the company, whereas the proportional rule
can. Hence, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle is
(sm, sh, sl) = (P, (in; out; in), (in; in; out)).
C2. If for all t ∈ {l, h},
P et ≥ Vt,out,
P eh + (1− πs)Sh(CEA, in) ≥ Vh,out, and
P el + (1− πs)Sl(CEL, in) < Vl,out,
then given the agents’ equilibrium actions in subgames ΓP , ΓCEA, and ΓCEL presented in
the previous subsection, the company prefers the proportional rule or the constrained equal
awards rule to the constrained equal losses rule and the equilibrium investment in the company
is Vm(F ) =
∑
t∈{l,h} ntwt. As we showed in the previous subsection, under these parameter
restrictions, both the constrained equal awards and the proportional rules can attract all
types to invest in the company whereas the constrained equal losses rule can only attract h
types. Hence, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁles are
(sm, sh, sl) = (P, (in; in; in), (in; in; out)) and
(sm, sh, sl) = (CEA, (in; in; in), (in; in; out)).
C3. If for all t ∈ {l, h},
P et ≥ Vt,out,
P eh + (1− πs)Sh(CEA, in) < Vh,out, and
P el + (1− πs)Sl(CEL, in) ≥ Vl,out,
then given the agents’ equilibrium actions in subgames ΓP , ΓCEA, and ΓCEL presented in the
previous subsection, the company prefers the proportional rule or the constrained equal losses
rule to the constrained equal awards rule and the equilibrium investment in the company is
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Vm(F ) =
∑
t∈{l,h} ntwt. As we showed in the previous subsection, under these parameter
restrictions, the constrained equal losses and the proportional rules can attract all types to
invest in the company whereas the constrained equal awards rule can only attract l types.
Hence, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁles are
(sm, sh, sl) = (P, (in; out; in), (in; in; in)) and
(sm, sh, sl) = (CEL, (in; out; in), (in; in; in)).
C4. If for all t ∈ {l, h},
P et ≥ Vt,out,
P eh + (1− πs)Sh(CEA, in) ≥ Vh,out, and
P el + (1− πs)Sl(CEL, in) ≥ Vl,out,
then given the agents’ equilibrium actions in subgames ΓP , ΓCEA, and ΓCEL presented in
the previous subsection, the company is indiﬀerent between all three rules, and the equilib-
rium investment in the company is Vm(F ) =
∑
t∈{l,h} ntwt. As we showed in the previous
subsection, under these parameter restrictions, all rules are equally able to attract all types
to invest in the company. Hence, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁles are
(sm, sh, sl) = (P, (in; in; in), (in; in; in)),
(sm, sh, sl) = (CEA, (in; in; in), (in; in; in)), and
(sm, sh, sl) = (CEL, (in; in; in), (in; in; in)).
C5. If for all t ∈ {l, h},
P et < Vt,out,
then given the agents’ equilibrium actions in subgames ΓP , ΓCEA, and ΓCEL presented in the
previous subsection,the company is indiﬀerent between all three rules, and the equilibrium
investment in the company is Vm(F ) = 0. Since P et < Vt,out is a necessary condition for
both types of agents’ equilibrium decisions to in none of the rules can attract neither of the
two types to invest in the company. Hence, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy
proﬁles are
(sm, sh, sl) = (P, (out; out; out), (out; out; out)),
(sm, sh, sl) = (CEA, (out; out; out), (out; out; out)), and
(sm, sh, sl) = (CEL, (out; out; out), (out; out; out)).
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Note that in C4 and C5 above, the company’s decision does not really matter. Basically, in
these cases, anything goes. As we have shown above, besides P et ≥ Vt,out,
P eh + (1− πs)Sh(CEA, in) ≥ Vh,out and
P el + (1− πs)Sl(CEL, in) ≥ Vl,out
should be satisﬁed in C4. The interpretation of this is that neither under CEA nor under CEL,
per-capita transfers from disadvantaged type of agents to advantaged type of agents are signiﬁcantly
high. This, intuitively, can be due to (i) a small diﬀerence between wl and wh, (ii) a low probability
of bankruptcy (i.e., 1− πs), or (iii) a small outside asset payoﬀ (r) in C4.
C5 shows another situation in which the decision will not make a diﬀerence. No matter which
rule the company chooses, the investment in the company will be 0. However, this has nothing
to do with the income distribution in the society. We already showed in Lemma 6 that P et ≥
Vt,out does not contain any income distribution parameters (e.g., nl, nh, wl and wh). Hence, the
validity of this condition depends only on the risk-return characteristics of investment alternatives.
Intuitively, if the payoﬀ from the risk-free asset is suﬃciently high, or the probability of bankruptcy
is suﬃciently high (or more generally the expected return from the risky investment is suﬃciently
low) then P et < Vt,out will hold, in which case the company’s decision cannot change the equilibrium
investment in the company. We analyze the eﬀect of changes in the parameters on the equilibrium
and the corresponding investment in the company in more detail in Section 6.
4.3 Equilibrium and Results
In Subsections 4.1 and 4.2, we analyzed agents’ and the company’s decisions and characterized all
subgame perfect Nash equilibria. In this subsection, we present some results which are implied by
this equilibrium analysis. The following proposition states that there always exists a pure strategy
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of game Γ.
Proposition 1 A pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of Γ exists.
Proof. Follows from the analyses in Subsections 4.1 and 4.2.
Below, we present our main result of the base model. It shows that the proportional rule has a
very strong position in our strategic setting.
Theorem 1 For any bankruptcy problem (C,E) ∈ B˜, there always exists a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of Γ, which involves the proportional rule.
Proof. Notice that in all ﬁve cases analyzed in Subsection 4.2, the subgame perfect Nash equilibria
involves the proportional rule. Since, we characterized all equilibria in Subsection 4.2, the result
immediately follows.
Notice that in C3, the subgame perfect Nash Equilibria do not involve the constrained equal
awards rule, in C2, the subgame perfect Nash equilibria do not involve the constrained equal losses
rule and in C1, the subgame perfect Nash Equilibria involve neither of these two rules. Hence, the
statement in the main theorem is valid only for the proportional rule.
The following corollary shows that our main result is robust with respect to changes in the
income distribution.
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Corollary 4 The statement in the main theorem is valid independent of the income distribution.
Proof. Take any income distribution characterized by the parameters, nh, nl, wh and wl. The con-
dition that determines equilibrium under P is: for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et ≥ Vt,out, which is independent
of the income distribution parameters as shown in Lemma 6. Thus, the result follows.
Note that P eh + (1− πs)Sh(CEA, in) ≥ Vh,out and P el + (1− πs)Sl(CEL, in) ≥ Vl,out depend on
income distribution parameters.
Theorem 1 and Corollary 4 provide a justiﬁcation from a noncooperative point of view for the
fact that the proportional rule is frequently employed in allocating a bankrupt company’s assets to
shareholders.
By Corollary 4, even if there is an uncertainty about the income distribution (i.e., the company
does not know the income distribution for sure) statements in the Theorem 1 are still valid. In fact,
for probability distributions that assign non-zero probability to all possible income distributions,
the proportional rule would be the unique optimal strategy for an expected-payoﬀ maximizing
company. Also, note that by Theorem 1 and Corollary 4, the average investment in the company
under the proportional rule is largest among the three rules.
Now suppose that the company chooses r along with F to maximize the proﬁt and later agents
decide on whether to invest in the company or invest in the risk-free asset. This endogenizes the
return rate, r. Optimization on r boils down to choosing a level of r that attracts the maximum
amount of investment in a cheapest way. Hence, the company chooses an r that makes agents
indiﬀerent between playing in and playing out. The following corollary shows that the result in the
main theorem becomes even stronger when we endogenize r.12
Corollary 5 Denote the extended game in which the company chooses F and r simultaneously by
Γr,F . Then, for any bankruptcy problem (C,E) ∈ B˜, there exists a unique subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of Γr,F , which involves the proportional rule.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the fact that the necessary and suﬃcient condition(s) for
agents to play in under the proportional rule is less restrictive than the corresponding conditions
under other rules. Hence, there always exists an r under P , which make agents play in and is still
lower than those corresponding values of r under the other rules.
5 Extensions
5.1 Larger Set of Rules
In this subsection, we show that our results remain valid if we enlarge the set of rules we use in our
model. Our ﬁrst candidate is the Talmud rule since it is one of the prominent bankruptcy rules,
along with three rules analyzed above and satisﬁes a large set of "desirable" properties (see Herrero
& Villar, 2001 and Thomson, 2006). Aumann & Maschler (1985), in a seminal article, propose the
Talmud rule as a consistent extension of the contested garment rule.
12 I would like to thank Kevin Hasker for pointing out this possible extension after a seminar.
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Deﬁnition 5 (Talmud Rule) For all (C,E) ∈ B˜, and all j ∈ N ,
TALj(C,E) ≡
{
min{ cj2 , λt} if E ≤
∑
i∈N
ci
2
cj −min{ cj2 , λt} if E ≥
∑
i∈N
ci
2
where λt solves
∑
i∈N TALi(C,E) = E.
Proposition 2 Denote the extended game for which F ∈ {P,CEA,CEL, TAL} by Γ̂ and let
(E,C) ∈ B˜,
(i) there always exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of Γ̂ that involves the proportional rule,
when E =∑i∈N ci2 and
(ii) there always exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of Γ̂ that involves the proportional rule
and Talmud rule, when E =
∑
i∈N
ci
2 (i.e., r = 1 and rf = 0).
Proof. Note that the Talmud rule coincides with the constrained equal awards rule (on adjusted
half-claims) if E ≤∑i∈N ci2 and with the constrained equal losses rule (on adjusted half-claims) if
E ≥∑i∈N ci2 (see Moreno-Ternero & Villar, 2006). When E =∑i∈N ci2 , the proportional rule and
the Talmud rule lead to the same awards vector. In Figure 2, path of awards for P (red line), CEA
(green line), CEL (blue line), and TAL (black line) are shown.
x
0 cl/2 cl
ch/2
TAL
P
CEA
E2
E1
ch
CEL
y
z
45°
45°
Figure 2: Path of Awards for P , CEA, CEL and, TAL
(i) In our model, the relative value of E with respect to
∑
i∈N
ci
2 is completely determined by values
of r and rf . For instance, E <
∑
i∈N
ci
2 corresponds to 1 < r − 2rf , E =
∑
i∈N
ci
2 to r = 1 and
rf = 0, and E >
∑
i∈N
ci
2 to r − 2rf < 1. Since we do not allow rf < 0 or r > 1, E <
∑
i∈N
ci
2
is not possible. Therefore, the Talmud rule coincides with the constrained equal losses rule in our
model for nhch+(nl−nh) cl2 ≤ E ≤
∑
i∈N ci (estate lines crossing the TAL path of awards between
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x and z in Figure 2). Hence, if nhch + (nl − nh) cl2 ≤ E ≤
∑
i∈N ci, then the result in Theorem 1
holds.
(ii) On the other hand, if
∑
i∈N
ci
2 ≤ E ≤ nhch + (nl − nh) cl2 (estate lines crossing the TAL path
of awards between x and y in Figure 2), then the payoﬀ vectors of TAL and CEL do not coincide.
Note that the TAL payoﬀs contain half-claims plus the CEL payoﬀs from truncated claims (i.e.,
ci − ci2 ) and the estate (i.e., E −
∑
i∈N
ci
2 ).
13 Thus, per-capita transfers type l agents make under
TAL (i.e., Sl(TAL, in)) are less than per-capita transfers type l agents make under CEL (i.e.,
Sl(CEL, in)) in this region. This implies that inequality conditions required for both types of
agents to play in are satisﬁed more easily for TAL than CEL in this region (observe that the TAL
path of awards is closer to the P path of awards than the CEL path of awards in this region). Also
note that as E → ∑i∈N ci2 , it becomes easier to satisfy the inequality conditions in TAL. Hence,
if
∑
i∈N
ci
2 ≤ E ≤ nhch+ (nl − nh) cl2 , the result in Theorem 1 is essentially valid: only diﬀerence is
that for the speciﬁc case, E =
∑
i∈N
ci
2 , TAL coincides with P and therefore the result in Theorem
1 holds also for the Talmud rule.
Moreno-Ternero & Villar (2006) generalize the Talmud rule by introducing the TAL-family of
rules, which contains the Talmud, constrained equal awards and the constrained equal losses rules
as special cases.
Deﬁnition 6 (TAL-family) The TAL-family consists of all rules of the following form: For some
θ ∈ [0, 1], for all (E,C) ∈ B˜ and for all i ∈ N ,
F θi (C,E) =
{
min{θci, λ} if E ≤
∑
i∈N θci
max{θci, ci − μ} if E ≥
∑
i∈N θci
where μ and λ solve
∑
i∈N F
θ
i (C,E) = E.
Note that F = CEL for θ = 0, F = CEA for θ = 1 and F = T for θ = 1/2. Moreover,
for all θ ∈ [0, 1], F θ coincides with the constrained equal awards rule (on adjusted θ-claims) if
E ≤ ∑i∈N θci and the constrained equal losses rule (on adjusted (1 − θ)-claims) if E ≥ ∑i∈N θci
(see Moreno-Ternero & Villar, 2006). On the other hand, note that P is not a member of the
TAL-family. If we change the game by including all members of the TAL-family along with the
proportional rule in the strategy space of the company, the extended game Γ˜ has inﬁnitely many
subgames which are ΓP and, for all θ ∈ [0, 1], Γθ. We can argue, along the same lines as the proof of
Proposition 2, that for any bankruptcy problem (E,C) ∈ B˜, there always exists a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium of Γ˜ with the proportional rule and the member of the TAL-family parametrized
by θ∗ = 1+rf1+r . Given r and rf ,
E∑
i∈N ci
=
1+rf
1+r ∈ [12 , 1). There exists a θ∗ ∈ [12 , 1] such that
θ∗ = 1+rf1+r , for which the awards vector under rule F
θ∗ coincides with the awards vector under
the proportional rule. Any other member of the TAL-family coincides either with the constrained
equal awards rule or the constrained equal losses rule (both on adjusted claims) given r and rf .
Therefore, a result similar to the one in Proposition 2 would follow.
5.2 Multiple Companies and Competition
So far we assume a single company for simplicity. However, in many cases there are more than one
company competing for the same group of investors in real life. In this subsection, we introduce
13TALi((c1, ..., cn), E) =
ci
2
+ CELi((
c1
2
, ..., cn
2
), E −∑i∈N ci2 )
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the competition between two companies. Below, we ﬁrst set up the model with two companies and
then present our results.
In this subsection, we assume that there are two companies (m and m) which are competing for
the same set of potential investors in Nl ∪Nh. We model the competition between these two com-
panies à la Stackelberg. Accordingly, m is the ﬁrst-mover and m is the second-mover. Risk-return
characteristics (πs, r, and rf ) are assumed to be identical for both companies and there is, again,
a single risk-free asset (with return r) available for agents. As in our base model, each company
chooses a bankruptcy rule out of three (P , CEA, and CEL) rules to maximize its investment
volume. However, now m moves ﬁrst and chooses a bankruptcy rule and then m, observing m’s
action, moves and also chooses a bankruptcy rule. Accordingly, m’s strategy space is denoted by
ψm = {P,CEA,CEL} and m’s strategy space is denoted by ψm = { (P, P ), (CEA,P ), (CEL,P ),
(P,CEA), (CEA,CEA), (CEL,CEA), (P,CEL), (CEA,CEL), (CEL,CEL) } where ﬁrst en-
tries refer to m’s actions and second entries refer to m’s actions. Each action couple (consisting
of actions of both companies) starts a subgame to be played by agents. We denote the subgame
started by m playing Fm and m playing Fm by ΓFm,Fm . After observing companies’ actions, agents
simultaneously choose whether to invest in one of the companies or in the risk-free outside asset.14
Since there are two companies now, agents i’s action set is ai = (m,m, out). For all i ∈ Nl∪Nh, we
denote the actions taken by agent i in subgame ΓFm,Fm as ai,ΓFmFm . We describe what each agent
i does in each subgame ΓFm,Fm by agent i’s strategy, which is again denoted by si ∈ ψi. Agent i’s
strategy space, ψi, can be written as
ψi = {(ai,ΓFmFm ) | Fm, Fm ∈ {P,CEA,CEL} and ai,ΓFm,Fm ∈ {m,m, out}}. (7)
We denote m’s payoﬀ function as Vm(Fm, Fm) =
∑
t∈{l,h} nt,m(Fm, Fm)wt, where nt,m stands
for the number of type t agents who invest in m in the subgame ΓFm,Fm and m’s payoﬀ function
as Vm(Fm, Fm) =
∑
t∈{l,h} nt,m(Fm, Fm)wt, where nt,m stands for the number of type t agents who
invest in m in the subgame ΓFm,Fm . Therefore, we can write the objective function for company
m ∈ {m,m} as
max
Fm∈{P,CEA,CEL}
Vm(Fm, .). (8)
We, again, focus on pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game. Moreover,
throughout this subsection, we focus on equilibria, which satisfy the following reﬁnement assump-
tions:
Assumption 1: Each agent plays his weakly dominant strategy in case there is one.15
Assumption 2: When a certain type of agents are indiﬀerent between two companies, half of
them invest in m and the other half in m.16
Table 5 deﬁnes the sequential game Γ.
14Each agent can invest in only one investment alternative, as it was in the base model.
15This is a fairly common assumption in the political economy, elections, and voting literature.
16This is a frequently made assumption in the industrial organization literature (e.g., Hotelling’s game). For this
assumption, we, further, need to assume that there are even number of agents of each type.
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Players {m,m} ∪Nl ∪Nh
Strategies ψm × ψm
∏
i∈Nl∪Nh
ψi
Payoﬀs (Vm(Fm, Fm), Vm(Fm, Fm)(Vi,si(Fm, Fm, s−i)), i ∈ Nl ∪Nh
Table 5: Sequential Game Γ.
where s−i denotes all agents’ strategies except agent i.
Below, we list our main ﬁndings. Formal proofs for these results can be found in Appendix C
where we characterize all Nash equilibria in each subgame and all subgame perfect Nash equilbria
of the extended model. In the following, we denote the total amount of money held by type l agents
(i.e.,
∑
i∈Nl wi) as Wl and the total amount of money held by type h agents (i.e.,
∑
i∈Nh wi) as Wh.
(i) The income distribution is very inﬂuential on companies’ decisions and hence the bankruptcy
rules chosen in equilibrium. In all subgame perfect Nash equilibria (except the ones that involve all
two-combinations of three rules), m, i.e., the ﬁrst-mover, chooses a bankruptcy rule favoring type
of agents with a larger Wt.
(ii) In all subgame perfect Nash equilibria (except the ones that involve all two-combinations of
three rules), m, i.e., the second-mover, follows the ﬁrst-mover by choosing the same bankruptcy rule
when Wh ≥ 2Wl (or Wl ≥ 2Wl). On the other hand, when 2Wl ≥Wh ≥Wl (or 2Wh ≥Wl ≥Wh),
the ﬁrst-mover and the second-mover choose diﬀerent bankruptcy rules in which case the ﬁrst-mover
has an advantage in terms of the amount of investments attracted.
(iii) Under some circumstances (e.g., Wh ≥ 2Wl or Wl ≥ 2Wl), the competition between two
companies leads to a smaller amount of total investment compared to the single-company case. In
such circumstances, m follows m by choosing the same rule that favors a certain type of agents.
The other type of agents do not invest in a company leading to a lower total investment compared
to the investment volume in the one-company case.
(iv) The type of agents with a larger Wt cannot obtain a payoﬀ advantage over the other type of
agents, even though the ﬁrst-mover chooses a bankruptcy rule that favors them in all generic cases.
When 2Wl ≥ Wh ≥ Wl (or 2Wh ≥ Wl ≥ Wh), companies choose diﬀerent bankruptcy rules and
each type of agent invests in the company whose bankruptcy rule favors his type (if they invest in
a company at all). Hence, there are no transfers between two types of agents. When Wh ≥ 2Wl
(or Wl ≥ 2Wl), both companies choose the same bankruptcy rule (the one that favors the type
of agents with a larger Wt) and only the type of agents who are favored by this rule invest in
companies. Hence, again, there are no transfers between two types of agents.
Our results in this subsection show that incorporating the competition for funds between bor-
rowers (companies) has a critical inﬂuence on bankruptcy rules chosen in equilibrium. Although,
the equilibria we ﬁnd in this extended model do not provide a noncooperative support for the pro-
portional rule, we show that the use of the proportional rule in the one-company case can attract
more investment compared to the two-company case, which involves other rules (see iii above).
Similarly, if a central authority implements the proportional rule in the two-company case, this can
attract more investment to these two companies than a liberal regime that allows companies to
choose their bankruptcy rules strategically (as modeled above). This can be considered as a ratio-
nale for a policymaker who aims to maximize the investment volume in the economy, to implement
the proportional rule in the two-company case.
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6 Comparative Static Analysis
In this section, we conduct comparative static analyses on the risk-return and income distribution
parameters. We show how the equilibrium investment in the company responds to changes in these
parameters. First of all, we present the closed form versions of the inequalities that determine the
equilibrium under each rule. This will help us in conducting comparative static analyses.
Recall that we have only (in, in) and (out, out) as (representative) subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium action proﬁles for agents. Therefore, in the following we provide the closed form expressions
of the inequalities that lead to these subgame perfect equilibria.
The Proportional Rule:
For (in, in) equilibrium,
P et ≥ Vt,out
is required. It can be written explicitly as
πs(1 + r)wt + (1− πs)(1 + rf )wt ≥ (1 + r)wt
πsr + rf − πsrf ≥ r
πs(r − rf ) ≥ r − rf
πs ≥ r − rf
r − rf . (9)
Obviously, πs <
r−rf
r−rf leads to (out, out) equilibrium. Moreover, recall that πs <
r−rf
r−rf also leads to
(out, out) equilibrium under CEA and CEL since πs ≥ r−rfr−rf is a necessary condition for any agent
to play in under any rule.
The Constrained Equal Awards Rule:
For (in, in) equilibrium
P et ≥ Vt,out and
P eh + (1− πs)Sh(CEA, in) ≥ Vh,out
is required. We consider two cases to express the second inequality explicitly under CEA:
(a-1) If ch > cl > λcea, then P eh + (1− πs)Sh(CEA, in) ≥ Vh,out can be written as,
πs(1 + r)wh + (1− πs)(1 + rf )wh + (1− πs) nl
nh + nh
[(1 + rf )(wl − wh)] ≥ (1 + r)wh,
which is equal to
nl
nl + nh
≤ wh
wh − wl
πsr + (1− πs)rf − r
(1− πs)(1 + rf ) . (10)
(a-2) If ch > λcea ≥ cl, then P eh + (1− πs)Sh(CEA, in) ≥ Vh,out can be written as,
πs(1 + r)wh + (1− πs)(1 + rf )wh + (1− πs) nl
nh
(rf − r)wl ≥ (1 + r)wh,
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which is equal to
nl
nh
≤ wh
wl
πsr + (1− πs)rf − r
(1− πs)(r − rf ) . (11)
The Constrained Equal Losses Rule:
For (in, in) equilibrium
P et ≥ Vt,out and
P el + (1− πs)Sl(CEL, in) ≥ Vl,out
is required. We consider two cases to express the second inequality explicitly under CEL:
(b-1) If ch > cl > λcel, then P el + (1− πs)Sl(CEL, in) ≥ Vl,out can be written as,
πs(1 + r)wl + (1− πs)(1 + rf )wl + (1− πs) nh
nh + nl
[(r − rf )(wl − wh)] ≥ (1 + r)wl,
which is equal to
nh
nh + nl
≤ wl
wh − wl
πsr + (1− πs)rf − r
(1− πs)(r − rf ) . (12)
(b-2) If ch > λcel ≥ cl, then P el + (1− πs)Sl(CEL, in) ≥ Vl,out can be written as,
πs(1 + r)wl ≥ (1 + r)wl,
which is equal to
πs ≥ 1 + r
1 + r
. (13)
Note that πs ≥ r−rfr−rf is already implicitly embedded in (10), (11), (12) and (13) also implies
it. Hence practically, we do not have two conditions determining the (in, in) equilibrium under
CEA and CEL. Below, we present a table consisting of parameters r, rf , r, πs, nl, nh, wl, and wh
and the eﬀects of changes in those parameters on inequalities that determine the subgame perfect
equilibrium investment in the company. In particular, + in a cell means that the inequality in the
corresponding column will still be valid after an increase in the respective parameter and − in a
cell means that the inequality in the corresponding column might not be valid after an increase.
variable/inequality (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
r + + + + +
rf + + + + no change
r − − − − −
πs + + + + +
nl no change − − + no change
nh no change + + − no change
wl no change + − + no change
wh no change − + − no change
Table 6: Comparative Static Analysis on the Set of SPNE
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The following proposition shows the relationship between risk-return parameters and the equi-
librium investment in the company.
Proposition 3 A change in r, rf , r and π can lead to only two types of changes in the equilibrium
investment:
(i) Either the equilibrium investment in the company decreases from
∑
t∈{l,h} ntwt to 0, or
(ii) the equilibrium investment in the company increases from 0 to
∑
t∈{l,h} ntwt.
Proof. In all subgame perfect Nash equilibria, there are only two possible levels of investment: 0
and
∑
t∈{l,h} ntwt. Hence, if a change in r, rf , r and π causes a change in the equilibrium investment
it can be either a movement from
∑
t∈{l,h} ntwt to 0, or a movement from 0 to
∑
t∈{l,h} ntwt.
Proposition 4 An increase in r, rf or πs can never decrease the equilibrium investment in the
company.
Proof. The proof is simple and hence omitted. It follows from the fact that agents’ expected payoﬀ
from playing in is increasing in r, rf and πs.
There is a large literature pointing out advantages of equity ﬁnancing (shareholdership) over
bank loans. Some governments (e.g., Turkey) use taxes on diﬀerent investment alternatives with
the aim of encouraging equity ﬁnancing and shareholdership (e.g., reducing taxes on stock market
earnings). Our result above points towards this direction. It shows that taxes on earnings from
the investment in the company can be used as a policy tool by the government to increase the
shareholdership in the economy. In particular, the government can increase the number of share-
holders as well as the investment in the company by decreasing the taxes on shareholder earnings.
On the other hand, the return from the risk-free outside asset (r) enters all inequalities above from
the right side with a positive sign. Therefore, an increase in r increases the attractiveness of the
risk-free asset i.e. playing out. Accordingly, the equilibrium investment in the company weakly
decreases as a result of an increase in r. Similar to the policy implication about r and rf above,
taxes on r can also be used as a policy tool. The government can increase the investment in the
company by increasing the taxes on the risk-free asset (e.g., increasing taxes on interest earnings).
The following proposition shows the relationship between income distribution parameters and
the equilibrium investment in the company.
Proposition 5 Decreases in nl, nh, wl and wh can never increase the equilibrium investment in
the company.
Proof. The proof is simple and follows from the following facts:
(i) The proportional rule is always a part of the equilibrium.
(ii) The condition determining the equilibrium strategies under the proportional rule is independent
of the income distribution parameters (i.e., nl, nh, wl and wh) as shown in Lemma 6.
(iii) If P et < Vt,out, the equilibrium investment in the company is 0 and does not change due to any
change in nl, nh, wl and wh.
(iv) If P et ≥ Vt,out, the equilibrium investment in the company under P is
∑
t∈{l,h} ntwt. Since the
change in
∑
t∈{l,h} ntwt with respect to a change in nl, nh, wl or wh, a decrease in any of these
parameters decreases the equilibrium investment in the company.
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Needless to say, increases in nl, nh, wl and wh can never decrease the equilibrium investment
in the company.
The following corollary shows the relationship between the impact a change in parameters has
on the equilibrium investment in the company under P and the impact it has on the subgame
perfect equilibrium level of investment in the company.
Corollary 6 The equilibrium investment volume changes only as a result of a change in parameters
that aﬀect the investment volume under the proportional rule.
Proof. The result follows from the fact that the proportional rule is the only rule that is always a
part of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Hence, if the equilibrium investment in the company
under P does not change as a result of a change in parameters, the subgame perfect equilibrium
level of investment in the company does not change.
This corollary implies that if the equilibrium investment in the company under CEA or CEL
drops as a result of a change in some parameter, this does not necessarily mean that the subgame
perfect equilibrium level of investment in the company drops, since P might still be leading to
nlwl + nhwh investment in the company. For example, as a result of a change in some parameter
the investment in the company under CEA (CEL) might drop from nlwl + nhwh to nlwl (nhwh),
but under P it might be still nlwl+nhwh. In that case, the subgame perfect equilibrium investment
in the company is still nlwl + nhwh. The equilibrium investment in the company drops to 0 only
if πs ≥ r−rfr−rf changes to πs <
r−rf
r−rf as a result of a change in some parameter. Hence, there are
still two possible equilibrium investment levels: nlwl + nhwh and 0. Similarly, the equilibrium
investment may not rise as a result of a change in some parameter, even if it causes an increase in
the investment under CEA or CEL.
7 Discussion
In this section, we discuss our assumptions, the way we set up our model, our results, extension
ideas and possible future research. For instance, we assume identical risk-attitudes (i.e., risk neu-
trality) for all agents. Our main purpose in this research is to integrate the models of bankruptcy
problem into a noncooperative game theoretical model that involves strategic decision-making un-
der uncertainty. Incorporating the simple bankruptcy model into a strategic context requires some
simpliﬁcations such as the ones we mentioned above. Below, we discuss some of our assumptions
and possible extensions.
Individual Optimization on the Level of Investment: In this paper, we assume that individuals do
not maximize their expected payoﬀs by choosing the amount of money they want to invest in the
company and in the savings account. They either invest in the company or deposit their money in
a savings account. However, if we allowed them to optimize under the risk-neutrality assumption,
we would have corner solutions where each agent, again, will either fully invest in the company or
in the savings account. Hence, our assumption on investment decision, is not very restrictive under
the risk-neutrality assumption.
T number of types: A natural question that arises is whether our results in the base model are valid
in a model with any ﬁnite number of types. If we assume T types and one agent per each type, by
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using Lemmas 1, 3, 6 and, 8 we can obtain results identical to the ones in the base model. On the
other hand, our ultimate goal is to extend our model to a more general setting, which includes T
types and nt number of type t agents. This is far from being trivial and is work in progress. The
main diﬃculty here is that when the number of certain type of agents change (used in our proofs),
the identity (e.g., transfer-maker or transfer-receiver) of some other types may also change, which
was not the case in the setting with two types. Hence, proofs should take these potential changes
into account. Nevertheless, we conjecture that our results are still valid in this extended model,
mainly due to the order-preserving nature of the bankruptcy rules used.
Distributive Properties: In a follow-up paper (see Karagözog˘lu, 2008), we analyze some distribu-
tive properties such as minimal rights ﬁrst, securement of initial investments, initial investments
ﬁrst, reasonable lower bounds on awards, and reasonable lower bounds on losses in the class of
bankruptcy problems with endogenous estates. We show that the proportional rule receives more
support compared to the constrained equal awards and the constrained equal losses rules. Some
normative properties that were not satisﬁed by the proportional rule in the general class of bank-
ruptcy problems are satisﬁed by this rule in the class of bankruptcy problems with an endogenous
estate. These changes are mostly due to the fact that estate and claims are not completely inde-
pendent in this class. As a result, certain values of the estate for which the proportional rule does
not satisfy certain properties are eliminated in this class of bankruptcy problems.
Bankruptcy Laws and Sequential Priority Rules: We observe that many bankruptcy laws apply
certain sequential priority rules in the liquidation of bankrupt companies’ assets. Priority classes
are deﬁned on the basis of seniority (e.g., founding stockholders or new stockholders), status of
creditors (e.g., stockholder or bondholder) or status of claims (e.g., secured or unsecured) etc.
The American bankruptcy law is a frequently quoted example in which priority classes are federal
government (taxes), trustees (administrative expenses of the trustee) and two kinds of creditors
(secured and unsecured claims). These rules and the constrained equal awards and constrained
equal losses rules have a commonality: in all of these rules, loosely speaking, there are people
favored by the rule (i.e., receiving transfers) and there are people disfavored by the rule (i.e.,
making transfers). In this paper, we show that the strength of the proportional rule stems from its
"neutrality" (zero transfers as a benchmark). Therefore, if we slightly modify our model to capture
priority criteria such as seniority or status, there will, again, exist some parameter values for which,
some agents do not invest in the company in equilibrium under the sequential priority rules. Loosely
speaking, the proportional rule will outperform sequential priority rules in attracting investment
to the company. Moreover, an important fact, which is in conformity with our results is that the
proportional rule is applied in the liquidation process within each priority class in sequential priority
rules.
Increasing Returns and/or Decreasing Risk: In certain real-life circumstances, one might suggest
that an increase in the investment volume can lead to an increase in the return rate (e.g., the
investment project involves increasing returns to capital) and/or a decrease in the rate of risk
(e.g., a higher level of capital increases the likelihood of success). If we incorporate these two
possibilities, we expect that our results would quantitatively change. The relative (with respect to
the proportional rule) positions of the constrained equal awards and the constrained equal losses
rules would improve. However, we expect no qualitative change in the results, i.e., the proportional
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rule would still have an advantage over others.17
Nonexistence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium Under Diﬀerent Risk Attitudes: If we assume that
the high type agents are risk-neutral and the low type agents are risk-averse, we show that a pure
strategy Nash Equilibrium might not exist under some parameter values. Below, we explain the
dynamics of the non-existence result in more detail.
The reason of non-existence under diﬀerent risk attitudes (in particular, risk neutral type h
agents and risk averse type l agents) is the high degree of conﬂict of interest and the availability
of an escape option (i.e., the risk-free asset) causing cyclicity. When we analyze the parameter
conditions under which there is no pure strategy equilibrium, we see that the cost that is imposed
on type h agents (type l agents) under CEA (CEL) can be understood as the level of conﬂict of
interest. For example, under CEA, if ch > λcea > cl, then the term
nl
nh
(rf − r)wl shows per-type
h-capita transfer to type l agents. A quick look at the term shows that if nh is high, then per-type
h-capita transfer is low, if nl is high it is high and if (rf − r) is high, it is again high. Therefore,
for some parameter values, under CEA, type h agents do not play in against type l agents playing
in. Hence, their best response to type l agents playing in is to play out. And type l agents’ best
response to type h agents playing out is also out. However, type h agents’ best response to type
l agents playing out is to play in and type l agents’ best response to type h agents playing in is
to play in. Hence, the process does not stop at an equilibrium. In the following, we construct an
example in which there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium under CEA.
Example 2 Assume that nl = nh = 1, wl = 10, wh = 100, r = 0.8, rf = 0.2, and r = 0.61.
Moreover, recall that type h agent is risk neutral whereas type l agent is risk-averse. This implies
that type l agent rejects fair gambles. Then, we can simply calculate the expected payoﬀs for the
type h agent as
P eh = (0.7)(1 + 0.8)100 + (0.3)(1 + 0.2)100 = 162 and
CEAeh = (0.7)(1 + 0.8)100 + (0.3)114 = 160.2.
Denote the utility function of the type l agent as U(.). Since
Vh,out = 161,
Vl,out = 16.1, and
CEAl = 18
the payoﬀ matrix can be written as
h \ l in out
in 160.2, U(18) 162, U(16.1)
out 161, (0.7)U(18) + (0.3)U(12) 161, U(16.1)
Risk-aversion implies that (0.7)U(18) + (0.3)U(12) < U(16.2). If (0.7)U(18) + (0.3)U(12) <
U(16.1) is also valid, then we do not have pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this game. BRh(in) =
17A similar increasing returns idea was analyzed by Izquierdo & Rafels (1996) who characterized the proportional
division in ﬁnancial (or deposit) games.
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out, BRl(out) = out, BRh(out) = in and BRl(in) = in. Hence, there is a cycle. As the reader
might realize, the statement "P eh ≥ Vh,out if and only if U(Pl) ≥ Vl,out" is not valid anymore, which
causes the cycle. The nonexistence result Kıbrıs & Kıbrıs (2008) have under CEA in a similar
setup (with potentially diﬀerent risk attitudes) is also in line with our arguments here.
Nonexistence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium Under Diﬀerent Outside Asset Payoﬀs: We as-
sumed that the risk-free asset brings the same payoﬀ to both types of agents in case they invest in
it. This is an unbiased (neutral) assumption to make. However there might be real life instances
in which there are diﬀerent risk-free assets available to diﬀerent types of agents (e.g., the risk-free
asset available to h agents might pay higher (lower) than the risk-free asset available to type l
agents). In that case, the company’s decision in equilibrium might be diﬀerent than the one we
described above. However, a problem with this more general approach is that, again, it can bring
non-existence results for some parameter values. Hence, we kept our neutral assumption that risk-
free asset pays the same return rate to all agents. In the following, we construct an example where
there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the subgame under CEA.
Example 3 Assume that nl = nh = 1, wl = 10, wh = 100, r = 0.8, rf = 0.2, rh = 0.61 and
rl = 0.63. Then, we can simply calculate the expected payoﬀs as
P eh = (0.7)(1 + 0.8)100 + (0.3)(1 + 0.2)100 = 162,
CEAeh = (0.7)(1 + 0.8)100 + (0.3)114 = 160.2,
P el = (0.7)(1 + 0.8)10 + (0.3)(1 + 0.2)10 = 16.2, and
CEAel = (0.7)(1 + 0.8)10 + (0.3)18 = 18.
Risk-free asset brings payoﬀs Vh,out = 161 and Vl,out = 16.3. Hence, the payoﬀ matrix can be
written as
h \ l in out
in 160.2, 18 162, 16.3
out 161, 16.2 161, 16.3
As the reader can notice, type h agent does not play in against type l agents playing in. Hence,
his best response to type l agent playing in is to play out. And type l agent’s best response to type
h agent playing out is also out. However, type h agent’s best response to type l agent playing out
is to play in and type l agent’s best response to type h agent playing in is to play in. Hence, the
process does not stop at an equilibrium. As the reader might realize, it is again the invalidity of
the statement "P eh ≥ Vh,out if and only if P el ≥ Vl,out", which causes the cycle.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a new class of bankruptcy problems, which have an empirical appeal.
In these bankruptcy problems, the value of the estate to be allocated to agents is endogenous and
depends on agents’ investment decisions. This is what we observe in many real life cases. For
instance the amount to be allocated by a ﬁrm to its shareholders/stockholders may depend on the
initial amount of money borrowed from them. Moreover, in line with some recent suggestions in
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favor of a more liberal bankruptcy law, which provides a menu of bankruptcy procedures and allows
companies to select among them (see Hart, 2000), we allow the company in our model to choose
from a menu of bankruptcy rules that consists of three well-known rules, i.e., the proportional rule,
the constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule. Company’s objective in
choosing a bankruptcy rule is to maximize the investment volume, which would lead to maximum
proﬁt. Agents observe the choice made by the company and decide whether to lend money to the
company (risky investment) or deposit their money in a savings account (risk-free investment).
Our results show that the proportional rule receives a strong and robust support in this setting.
There always exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which involves the proportional rule. A
direct implication is that there is no equilibrium in which the proportional rule leads to a lower level
of investment volume than the other rules. This result is independent of the income distribution in
the economy and holds even under one-sided uncertainty on income distribution (i.e., the company
does not know the income distribution perfectly). In fact, for probability distributions that assign
non-zero probability to all possible income distributions, the proportional rule would be the unique
optimal strategy for an expected payoﬀ maximizing company. In a more complete setting where
the company maximizes its proﬁt by choosing a bankruptcy rule and a return rate, there exists a
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which involves the proportional rule. We also extend
the menu of rules to include the Talmud rule and show that results essentially do not change.
Moreover, we argue, along the same lines, that our results are still valid in a game that contains
TAL-family of rules that contains inﬁnitely many rules some of which are the Talmud rule, the
constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule. We also extend our model to
incorporate the competition between two companies over potential investors. This extension oﬀers
interesting results and insights. Equilibria in this extended model depend crucially on the income
distribution. In particular, the type of agents with a higher total amount of money and the level of
income inequality determine the bankruptcy rules chosen by companies. Results of this extension
also show that the competition between two companies can lead to a lower investment volume in
the economy compared to the one-company model, which involves the proportional rule. This also
implies that a policymaker who aims to maximize the investment volume in the economy can use
the proportional rule, instead of allowing the companies to choose their own rules strategically to
maximize their own investment volumes.
Our results provide, at least, partial explanations from a strategic and policymaking points
of view for the fact that the proportional rule is frequently used in the liquidation process of a
bankrupt company’s assets (e.g., Hart, 2000 and Kaminski, 2006). To the best of our knowledge,
this is the ﬁrst paper which models the bankruptcy rule determination as a sequential game between
lenders (agents) and borrowers (companies). It is also the ﬁrst paper, which embeds the classical
bankruptcy problem in a decision-making under uncertainty environment.
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Appendix:
A - Comparative Static Analysis Calculations
Closed Form Expressions for Transfers
Sh(CEA, in) =
nl(rf − r)wl
nh
if ch > λcea ≥ cl
Sh(CEA, in) =
nl
nh + nl
(1 + rf )(wl − wh) if ch > cl ≥ λcea
Sl(CEA, in) = (r − rf )wl if ch > λcea ≥ cl
Sl(CEA, in) =
nl
nh + nl
(1 + rf )(wh − wl) if ch > cl ≥ λcea
Sl(CEL, in) =
nh
nh + nl
(r − rf )(wl − wh) if ch > cl > λcel
Sl(CEL, in) = −(1 + rf )wl if ch > λcel ≥ cl
Sh(CEL, in) =
nl
nh + nl
(r − rf )(wh − wl) if ch > cl > λcel
Sh(CEL, in) =
nl
nh
(1 + rf )wl if ch > λcel ≥ cl
Comparative Static Analysis Calculations
Since nh,in and nl,in are discrete variables, we cannot look at derivatives. Hence, we look at
diﬀerences. Now, we deﬁne the diﬀerence operator. The change in St(., ., .) with respect to a unit
change in nt,in is denoted by
St(F,nh,in,nl,in)
nt,in .
Sh(CEA, in) =
nl(rf − r)wl
nh
if ch > λcea ≥ cl
• Change in Sh(CEA, in) with respect to nl, if ch > λcea ≥ cl
Sh(CEA,in)
nl =
wl(rf−r)
nh
< 0
• Change in Sh(CEA, in) with respect to nh, if ch > λcea ≥ cl
Sh(CEA,in)
nh =
−nlwl(rf−r)
(nh)2
or −nlwl(rf−r)(nh+1)nh > 0
• Change in Sh(CEA, in) with respect to wl, if ch > λcea ≥ cl
∂Sh(CEA,in)
∂wl
=
nl(rf−r)
nh
< 0
• Change in Sh(CEA, in) with respect to wh, if ch > λcea ≥ cl
∂Sh(CEA,in)
∂wh
= 0
Sh(CEA, in) =
nl
nh + nl
(1 + rf )(wl − wh) if ch > cl ≥ λcea
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• Change in Sh(CEA, in) with respect to nl, if ch > cl ≥ λcea
Sh(CEA,in)
nl =
nh(1+rf )(wl−wh)
(nh+nl)2
or nh(1+rf )(wl−wh)(nh+nl+1)(nh+nl) < 0
• Change in Sh(CEA, in) with respect to nh, if ch > cl ≥ λcea
Sh(CEA,in)
nh = −
nl(1+rf )(wl−wh)
(nh+nl)2
or − nl(1+rf )(wl−wh)(nh+nl+1)(nh+nl) > 0
• Change in Sh(CEA, in) with respect to wl, if ch > cl ≥ λcea
∂Sh(CEA,in)
∂wl
= nlnh+nl (1 + rf ) > 0
• Change in Sh(CEA, in) with respect to wh, if ch > cl ≥ λcea
∂Sh(CEA,in)
∂wh
= − nlnh+nl (1 + rf ) < 0
Sl(CEA, in) = (r − rf )wl if ch > λcea ≥ cl
• Change in Sl(CEA, in) with respect to nl, if ch > λcea ≥ cl
Sl(CEA,in)
nl = 0
• Change in Sl(CEA, in) with respect to nh, if ch > λcea ≥ cl
Sl(CEA,in)
nh = 0
• Change in Sl(CEA, in) with respect to wl, if ch > λcea ≥ cl
∂Sl(CEA,in)
∂wl
= (r − rf ) > 0
• Change in Sl(CEA, in) with respect to wh, if ch > λcea ≥ cl
∂Sl(CEA,in)
∂wh
= 0
Sl(CEA, in) =
nh
nh + nl
(1 + rf )(wh − wl) if ch > cl ≥ λcea
• Change in Sl(CEA, in) with respect to nl, if ch > cl ≥ λcea
Sl(CEA,in)
nl = −
nh(1+rf )(wh−wl)
(nh+nl)2
or − nh(1+rf )(wh−wl)(nh+nl+1)(nh+nl) < 0
• Change in Sl(CEA, in) with respect to nh, if ch > cl ≥ λcea
Sl(CEA,in)
nh =
nl(1+rf )(wh−wl)
(nh+nl)2
or nl(1+rf )(wh−wl)(nh+nl+1)(nh+nl) > 0
• Change in Sl(CEA, in) with respect to wl, if ch > cl ≥ λcea
∂Sl(CEA,in)
∂wl
= − nhnh+nl (1 + rf ) < 0
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• Change in Sl(CEA, in) with respect to wh, if ch > cl ≥ λcea
∂Sl(CEA,in)
∂wh
= nhnh+nl (1 + rf ) > 0
Sl(CEL, in) =
nh
nh + nl
(r − rf )(wl − wh) if ch > cl > λcel
• Change in Sl(CEL, in) with respect to nl, if ch > cl > λcel
Sl(CEL,in)
nl = −
nh(wl−wh)(r−rf )
(nh+nl)2
or − nh(wl−wh)(r−rf )(nh+nl+1)(nh+nl) > 0
• Change in Sl(CEL, in) with respect to nh, if ch > cl > λcel
Sl(CEL,in)
nh =
nl(wl−wh)(r−rf )
(nh+nl)2
or nl(wl−wh)(r−rf )(nh+nl+1)(nh+nl) < 0
• Change in Sl(CEL, in) with respect to wl, if ch > cl > λcel
∂Sl(CEL,in)
∂wl
= nhnh+nl (r − rf ) > 0
• Change in Sl(CEL, in) with respect to wh, if ch > cl > λcel
∂Sl(CEL,in)
∂wh
= − nhnh+nl (r − rf ) < 0
Sl(CEL, in) = −(1 + rf )wl if ch > λcel ≥ cl
• Change in Sl(CEL, in) with respect to nl, if ch > λcel ≥ cl
Sl(CEL,in)
nl = 0
• Change in Sl(CEL, in) with respect to nh, if ch > λcel ≥ cl
Sl(CEL,in)
nh = 0
• Change in Sl(CEL, in) with respect to wl, if ch > λcel ≥ cl
∂Sl(CEL,in)
∂wl
= −(1 + rf ) < 0
• Change in Sl(CEL, in) with respect to wh, if ch > λcel ≥ cl
∂Sl(CEL,in)
∂wh
= 0
Sh(CEL, in) =
nl
nh + nl
(r − rf )(wh − wl) if ch > cl > λcel
• Change in Sh(CEL, in) with respect to nl, if ch > cl > λcel
Sh(CEL,in)
nl =
nh(wh−wl)(r−rf )
(nh+nl)2
or nh(wh−wl)(r−rf )(nh+nl+1)(nh+nl) > 0
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• Change in Sh(CEL, in) with respect to nh, if ch > cl > λcel
Sh(CEL,in)
nh = −
nl(wh−wl)(r−rf )
(nh+nl)2
or − nl(wh−wl)(r−rf )(nh+nl+1)(nh+nl) < 0
• Change in Sh(CEL, in) with respect to wl, if ch > cl > λcel
∂Sh(CEL,in)
∂wl
= − nlnh+nl (r − rf ) < 0
• Change in Sh(CEL, in) with respect to wh, if ch > cl > λcel
∂Sh(CEL,in)
∂wh
= nlnh+nl (r − rf ) > 0
Sh(CEL, in) =
nl
nh
(1 + rf )wl if ch > λcel ≥ cl
• Change in Sh(CEL, in) with respect to nl, if ch > λcel ≥ cl
Sh(CEL,in)
nl =
(1+rf )wl
nh
> 0
• Change in Sh(CEL, in) with respect to nh, if ch > λcel ≥ cl
Sh(CEL,in)
nh = −
nl(1+rf )wl
(nh)2
or − nl(1+rf )wl(nh+1)(nh) < 0
• Change in Sh(CEL, in) with respect to wl, if ch > λcel ≥ cl
∂Sh(CEL,in)
∂wl
= nlnh (1 + rf ) > 0
• Change in Sh(CEL, in) with respect to wh, if ch > λcel ≥ cl
∂Sh(CEL,in)
∂wh
= 0
B - Proofs of Preparatory Results
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) Assume that the number of claimants for whom cj ≤ λcea is k∗ < n.
It immediately follows that for all cj ≤ λcea, CEAj(C,E) = cj . Therefore, for all cj ≤ λcea, since
Pj(C,E) < cj , we get CEAj(C,E) > Pj(C,E). We now analyze the case, cj > λcea. For all such
claimants, CEAj(C,E) = λcea. This can be written as
CEAj(C,E) = λcea =
E −∑k∗i=1 ci
n− k∗ .
Furthermore, we know that
Pj(C,E) = cj
E∑
i∈N ci
.
To ﬁnd out whether there exists c∗, which satisﬁes the statement in the lemma, we consider the
equality,
E −∑k∗i=1 ci
n− k∗ = c
∗ E∑
i∈N ci
.
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This can be rewritten as
c∗ =
(E −∑k∗i=1 ci)∑i∈N ci
(n− k∗)E = λcea
∑
i∈N ci
E
. (14)
Since (E −∑k∗i=1 ci) > 0, c∗ > 0. Moreover, since∑
i∈N ci
E
> 1
(by the deﬁnition of bankruptcy), we have c∗ > λcea. Now, pick an agent j such that λcea < cj .
Then,
cj  c∗ ⇔ Pj(C,E) = cj E∑
i∈N ci
 c∗ E∑
i∈N ci
.
Using (14), we can rewrite this as
cj  c∗ ⇔ Pj(C,E) = cj E∑
i∈N ci
 λcea
∑
i∈N ci
E
E∑
i∈N ci
= λcea = CEAj(C,E).
Thus, the result follows.
(ii) Assume that the number of claimants for whom cj ≤ λcel is k˜ < n. It immediately follows
that for all cj ≤ λcel, CELj(C,E) = 0. Therefore, for all cj ≤ λcel, since 0 < Pj(C,E), we get
CELj(C,E) < Pj(C,E). We now analyze the case cj > λcel. For all such claimants, CELj(C,E) =
cj − λcel > 0, where λcel can be written as
λcel =
∑n
i=˜k+1
ci − E
n− k˜
.
Therefore, for all cj > λcel, CELj(C,E) can be written as
CELj(C,E) = cj −
∑n
i=˜k+1
ci − E
n− k˜
.
Furthermore, we know that
Pj(C,E) = cj
E∑
i∈N ci
.
To ﬁnd out whether there exists c˜, which satisﬁes the statement in the lemma, we consider the
equality,
c˜−
∑n
i=˜k+1
ci − E
n− k˜
= c˜
E∑
i∈N ci
.
This can be rewritten as
c˜ =
(
∑n
i=˜k+1
ci − E)
∑
i∈N ci
(n− k˜)(∑i∈N ci − E) = λcel
∑
i∈N ci∑
i∈N ci − E
> 0. (15)
Moreover, since ∑
i∈N ci∑
i∈N ci − E
> 1,
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we have c˜ > λcel. Now pick an agent j such that cj > λcel. Then,
cj  c˜⇔ Pj(C,E) = cj E∑
i∈N ci
 c˜ E∑
i∈N ci
.
Using (15), we can rewrite this as
cj  c˜⇔ Pj(C,E) = cj E∑
i∈N ci
 λcel
∑
i∈N ci∑
i∈N ci − E
E∑
i∈N ci
= λcel
E∑
i∈N ci − E
.
We know that an agent j with a claim cj > λcel receives a payoﬀ, CELj(C,E) = cj − λcel and at
cj = c˜,
CELj(C,E) = cj − λcel = λcel E∑
i∈N ci − E
= Pj(C,E).
Moreover, at cj = λcel
Pj(C,E) = λcel
E∑
i∈N ci
> 0 = CELj(C,E).
Therefore, these two linear functions (i.e., Pj(C,E) = cj(E/
∑
i∈N ci) and CELj(C,E) = cj−λcel)
take diﬀerent values at cj = λcel and the same value at cj = c˜. In particular, Pj(C,E) takes a
higher value at cj = λcel. Therefore, cj  c˜ implies
Pj(C,E) = cj
E∑
i∈N ci
 CELj(C,E).
Hence, c˜ satisﬁes the statement in (ii).
Proof of Lemma 2. Under CEA, there are two cases: (a-1) ch > cl > λcea and (a-2) ch > λcea ≥
cl.
(a-1) If ch > cl ≥ λcea, then CEA allocates the estate equally. Hence, CEAl(C,E) =
CEAh(C,E) =
E
nh+nl
. Therefore,
Sl(C,E,CEA) = (
E
n
− E
nhch + nlcl
cl),
which satisﬁes
Sl(C,E,CEA) =
Enh[ch − cl]
[nh + nl][nhch + nlcl]
> 0. (16)
Similarly, Sh(C,E,CEA) can be written as
Sh(C,E,CEA) = (
E
n
− E
nhch + nlcl
ch),
which satisﬁes
Sh(C,E,CEA) =
Enl[cl − ch]
[nh + nl][nhch + nlcl]
< 0. (17)
(a-2) If ch > λcea ≥ cl, then for each agent with claim cl, CEAl(C,E) = cl and for each agent with
claim ch, CEAh(C,E) =
E−nlcl
nh
. Therefore,
Sl(C,E,CEA) = cl(1− E
nhch + nlcl
),
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which satisﬁes
Sl(C,E,CEA) =
cl[nhch + nlcl − E]
nhch + nlcl
> 0. (18)
Similarly, Sh(C,E,CEA) can be written as
Sh(C,E,CEA) = (
E − nlcl
nh
− E
nhch + nlcl
),
which satisﬁes
Sh(C,E,CEA) =
nlcl[E − nhch − nlcl]
nh[nhch + nlcl]
< 0. (19)
Under CEL, there are two cases: (b-1) ch > cl > λcel and (b-2) ch > λcel ≥ cl.
(b-1) If ch > cl > λcel, then CEL allocates losses equally. Hence, for each agent with
claim cl, CELl(C,E) = cl − (nhch+nlcl−Enh+nl ) and for each agent with claim ch, CELh(C,E) =
ch − (nhch+nlcl−Enh+nl ). Therefore,
Sl(C,E,CEL) = [cl − (nhch + nlcl − E
nh + nl
)− E
nhch + nlcl
cl],
which satisﬁes
Sl(C,E,CEL) =
nh[cl − ch][nhch + nlcl − E]
[nh + nl][nhch + nlcl]
< 0. (20)
Similarly, Sh(C,E,CEL) can be written as
Sh(C,E,CEL) = [ch − (nhch + nlcl − E
nh + nl
)− E
nhch + nlcl
ch],
which satisﬁes
Sh(C,E,CEL) =
nl[ch − cl][nhch + nlcl − E]
[nh + nl][nhch + nlcl]
> 0. (21)
(b-2) If ch > λcel ≥ cl, then for each agent with claim cl, CELl(C,E) = 0 and for each agent with
claim ch, CELh(C,E) = Enh . Therefore,
Sl(C,E,CEL) = − E
nhch + nlcl
cl < 0 (22)
and
Sh(C,E,CEL) =
nl
nh
Ecl
nhch + nlcl
> 0. (23)
Proof of Lemma 3. Below, we plug into Vj,in(P, nh,in, nl,in) = cj,in E∑
i∈Nl∪Nh
ci,in
,
(1 + rf )
∑
i∈Nl∪Nh wi,in for E,
(1 + r)
∑
i∈Nl∪Nh wi,in for
∑
i∈Nl∪Nh ci,in, and
(1 + r)wj for cj .
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Hence,
Vj,in(P, nh,in, nl,in) = (1 + r)wj
(1 + rf )
∑
i∈Nl∪Nh wi,in
(1 + r)
∑
i∈Nl∪Nh wi,in
,
= (1 + rf )wj = Pj .
Proof of Lemma 4. (i) Pick any nn,in > 0 and nl,in > 0. We know by Corollary 2 that
Sl(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) > 0 and
Sh(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) < 0.
Therefore, by the deﬁnition of c∗ (see Lemma 1), cl ≤ c∗ ≤ ch.
(ii) Pick any nn,in > 0 and nl,in > 0. We know by Corollary 2 that
Sh(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) > 0 and
Sl(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) < 0.
Therefore, by the deﬁnition of c˜ (see Lemma 1), cl ≤ c˜ ≤ ch.
Proof of Lemma 5. (i) There are two possible cases for CEA: (a-1) ch > cl > λcea and (a-2)
ch > λcea ≥ cl. We know from Corollary 2 (a-1),
Sl(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) =
nh,in
nh,in + nl,in
(1 + rf )(wh − wl).
Thus,
Sl(CEA, nh,in, nl,in)
nl,in = −
nh,in
(nh,in + nl,in + 1)(nh,in + nl,in)
(1 + rf )(wh − wl) < 0.
On the other hand, in Corollary 2 (a-2),
Sl(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) = (r − rf )wl.
Thus,
Sl(CEL, nh,in, nl,in)
nl,in = 0.
(ii) There are two possible cases for CEA: (a-1) and (a-2). We know from Corollary 2 (a-1),
Sh(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) =
nl,in
nh,in + nl,in
(1 + rf )(wl − wh).
Thus,
Sh(CEA, nh,in, nl,in)
nl,in =
nh,in(1 + rf )(wl − wh)
(nh,in + nl,in + 1)(nh,in + nl,in)
< 0.
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On the other hand, in Corollary 2 (a-2),
Sh(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) =
nl,in
nh,in
(rf − r)wl.
Thus,
Sh(CEA, nh,in, nl,in)
nl,in =
(rf − r)wl
nh,in
< 0.
(iii) There are two possible cases for CEL: (b-1) ch > cl > λcel and (b-2) ch > λcel ≥ cl. We know
from Corollary 2 (b-1),
Sl(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) =
nh,in
nh,in + nl,in
(r − rf )(wl − wh).
Thus,
Sl(CEL, nh,in, nl,in)
nh,in =
nl,in
(nh,in + nl,in + 1)(nh,in + nl,in)
(r − rf )(wl − wh) < 0.
On the other hand, in Corollary 2 (b-2),
Sl(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) = −(1 + rf )wl.
Thus,
Sl(CEL, nh,in, nl,in)
nh,in = 0.
(iv) There are two possible cases for CEL: (b-1) and (b-2). We know from Corollary 2 (b-1),
Sh(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) =
nl,in
nh,in + nl,in
[(r − rf )(wh − wl)].
Thus,
Sh(CEL, nh,in, nl,in)
nh,in = −
nl,in
(nh,in + nl,in + 1)(nh,in + nl,in)
(r − rf )(wh − wl) < 0.
On the other hand, in Corollary 2 (b-2),
Sh(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) =
nl,in
nh,in
(1 + rf )wl.
Thus,
Sh(CEL, nh,in, nl,in)
nh,in = −
nl,in
(nh,in + 1)(nh,in)
(1 + rf )wl < 0.
(v) There are two possible cases for CEA: (a-1) ch > cl > λcea and (a-2) ch > λcea ≥ cl. We know
from Corollary 2 (a-1),
Sl(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) =
nh,in
nh,in + nl,in
(1 + rf )(wh − wl).
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Thus,
Sl(CEA, nh,in, nl,in)
nh,in =
nl,in
(nh,in + nl,in + 1)(nh,in + nl,in)
(1 + rf )(wh − wl) > 0.
On the other hand, in Corollary 2 (a-2),
Sl(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) = (r − rf )wl.
Thus,
Sl(CEL, nh,in, nl,in)
nl,in = 0.
(vi) There are two possible cases for CEA: (a-1) and (a-2). We know from Corollary 2 (a-1),
Sh(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) =
nl,in
nh,in + nl,in
(1 + rf )(wl − wh) < 0.
Thus,
Sh(CEA, nh,in, nl,in)
nh,in = −
nl,in
(nh,in + nl,in + 1)(nh,in + nl,in)
(1 + rf )(wl − wh) > 0.
On the other hand, in Corollary 2 (a-2),
Sh(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) =
nl,in
nh,in
(rf − r)wl < 0.
Thus,
Sh(CEA, nh,in, nl,in)
nh,in = −
nl,in
nh,in(nh,in + 1)
(rf − r)wl > 0.
(vii) There are two possible cases for CEL: (b-1) ch > cl > λcel and (b-2) ch > λcel ≥ cl. We know
from Corollary 2 (b-1),
Sl(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) =
nh,in
nh,in + nl,in
(r − rf )(wl − wh) < 0.
Thus,
Sl(CEL, nh,in, nl,in)
nl,in = −
nh,in
(nh,in + nl,in + 1)(nh,in + nl,in)
(r − rf )(wl − wh) > 0.
On the other hand, in Corollary 2 (b-2),
Sl(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) = −(1 + rf )wl < 0.
Therefore,
Sl(CEL, nh,in, nl,in)
nl,in = 0.
(viii) There are two possible cases for CEL: (b-1) and (b-2). We know from Corollary 2 (b-1),
Sh(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) =
nl,in
nh,in + nl,in
[(r − rf )(wh − wl)] > 0.
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Thus,
Sh(CEL, nh,in, nl,in)
nl,in =
nh,in
(nh,in + nl,in + 1)(nh,in + nl,in)
[(r − rf )(wh − wl)] > 0.
On the other hand, in Corollary 2 (b-2),
Sh(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) =
nl,in
nh,in
(1 + rf )wl.
Thus,
Sh(CEL, nh,in, nl,in)
nl,in =
(nl,in + 1)
nh,in
(1 + rf )wl > 0.
Proof of Lemma 6. We know that Pt = (1 + rf )wt and Vt = (1 + r)wt. The expected payoﬀ of
a type t agent under P can be written as
P ei = πs(1 + r)wt + (1− πs)(1 + rf )wt.
Therefore, a type t agent chooses to play in under P if
P ei = πs(1 + r)wt + (1− πs)(1 + rf )wt ≥ (1 + r)wt = Vi,out.
This condition can be rewritten as
πs(1 + r) + (1− πs)(1 + rf ) ≥ (1 + r).
Since there are no income parameters in this inequality, it implies that for any two agents of diﬀerent
types, the condition determining their strategies under P is identical, i.e.,
P eh ≥ Vh,out ⇔ P el ≥ Vl,out. (24)
Proof of Lemma 7. We analyze P , CEA, and CEL separately since the argumentation for each
case will be slightly diﬀerent.
(P) Suppose, by a contradiction, that two agents i and j of type t play diﬀerent strategies in
equilibrium. By Lemma 3, Pi = (1 + rf )wi in case of bankruptcy. On the other hand, agent
i’s payoﬀ is (1 + r)wi in case of successful completion of the project and the outside option pays
(1 + r)wi. Since for all i, j ∈ Nt,
P ei = πs[(1 + r)wt] + (1− πs)[(1 + rf )wt] and
P ej = πs[(1 + r)wt] + (1− πs)[(1 + rf )wt],
we have
πs[(1 + r)wt] + (1− πs)[(1 + rf )wt] ≥ (1 + r)wt ⇔
πs[(1 + r)wt] + (1− πs)[(1 + rf )wt] ≥ (1 + r)wt.
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However, this logical statement implies that agents i and j cannot have diﬀerent strategies in
equilibrium; a contradiction. Hence the result follows.
The proofs for CEA and CEL require a separate analysis for l type agents and h type agents,
since these agents are treated diﬀerently by CEA and CEL.
(CEA) Suppose, by contradiction, that in equilibrium there exists an agent i ∈ Nh who plays in
whereas another agent j ∈ Nh plays out under CEA. We denote the number of type h agents
playing in as nh,in and the number of type l agents playing in as nl,in. We consider two cases:
(CEA - i) there is at least one agent k ∈ Nl who plays in and (CEA - ii) there is no agent k ∈ Nl
who plays in.
(CEA - i) If there is at least one agent k ∈ Nl who plays in, i.e., nl,in ≥ 1, by Corollary 2,
if ch > cl > λcea, then Sh(CEA, in) =
nl
nh + nl
[(1 + rf )(wl − wh)] < 0 and
if ch > λcea ≥ cl, then Sh(CEA, in) = nl(rf − r)wl
nh
< 0.
Hence, we know that Si(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) < 0. Also, the equilibrium property and our tie-breaking
assumption imply that
V ei,in(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) = P
e
i + (1− πs)Si(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) ≥ Vi,out
and
V ej,in(CEA, nh,in + 1, nl,in) = P
e
j + (1− πs)Sj(CEA, nh,in + 1, nl,in) < Vj,out.
Now, assume that player j switches to in. Then, number of type h agents playing in is nh,in + 1.
The deﬁnition of CEA, the equilibrium property, and our tie-breaking assumption imply that
V ei,in(CEA, nh,in + 1, nl,in) = V
e
j,in(CEA, nh,in + 1, nl,in) < Vj,out ≡ Vi,out.
On the other hand, by Corollary 2 and Lemma 5,
Si(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) < Si(CEA, nh,in + 1, nl,in) < 0.
Hence,
V ei,in(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) < V
e
i,in(CEA, nh,in + 1, nl,in).
Therefore,
V ei,in(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) < V
e
i,in(CEA, nh,in + 1, nl,in) ≤ Vi,out
⇒ V ei,in(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) < Vi,out.
However, if the above inequality is satisﬁed, agent i playing in at the beginning cannot be an
optimal action for him; a contradiction. Hence the result follows.
(CEA - ii) If there is no agent k ∈ Nl who plays in under CEA in equilibrium, i.e., nl,in = 0, this
implies
Si(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) = 0 and
V ei,in(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) = P
e
i .
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However, this implies that P ei ≥ Vi,out. Hence, from (P) the result follows.
Now, suppose that in equilibrium there exists an agent i ∈ Nl who plays in whereas another
agent j ∈ Nl plays out under CEA. We consider two cases: (CEA - iii) there is at least one agent
k ∈ Nh who plays in and (CEA - iv) there is no agent k ∈ Nh who plays in.
(CEA - iii) If there is at least one agent k ∈ Nh who plays in, i.e., nh,in ≥ 1, by Corollary 2,
if ch > cl > λcea, then Sh(CEA, in) =
nl
nh + nl
[(1 + rf )(wl − wh)] < 0 and
if ch > λcea ≥ cl, then Sh(CEA, in) = nl(rf − r)wl
nh
< 0.
Hence, we know that
Sk(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) < 0 and
V ek,in(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) = P
e
k + (1− πs)Sk(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) ≥ Vk,out.
Now, assume that agent j switches to playing in. The deﬁnition of CEA, the equilibrium property,
and our tie-breaking assumption imply that
V ei,in(CEA, nh,in, nl,in + 1) = V
e
j,in(CEA, nh,in, nl,in + 1) < Vj,out ≡ Vi,out
where,
V ej,in(CEA, nh,in, nl,in + 1) = P
e
j + (1− πs)Sj(CEA, nh,in, nl,in + 1) and
Sj(CEA, nh,in, nl,in + 1) > 0.
However, if
V ek,in(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) = P
e
k + (1− πs)Sk(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) ≥ Vk,out,
then by proportionality,
P ek ≥ Vk,out ⇔ P ej ≥ Vj,out
and by Corollary 2 and Lemma 5
Sk(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) < 0 and Sj(CEA, nh,in, nl,in + 1) > 0
leads to
V ej,in(CEA, nh,in, nl,in + 1) = V
e
i,in(CEA, nh,in, nl,in + 1) ≤ Vj,out,
which is a contradiction. Thus, in equilibrium if it is an optimal action for a type h agent to play
in under CEA, it cannot be an optimal action for any type l agent to play out, since any type l
agent will have non-negative transfers. Hence, the result follows.
(CEA - iv) If there is no agent k ∈ Nh who plays in under CEA in equilibrium, i.e., nh,in = 0,
this implies
Si(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) = 0 and
V ei,in(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) = P
e
i .
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Then, if agent j switches to playing in, by Corollary 2 and Lemma 5,
Sk(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) > Sk(CEA, nh,in, nl,in + 1).
Then, there will still be no agent k ∈ Nh who plays in. Hence, expected payoﬀs of type l agents
will not be aﬀected by the existence of other type l agents playing in, which implies
V ei,in(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) = V
e
i,in(CEA, nh,in, nl,in + 1)
= V ej,in(CEA, nh,in, nl,in + 1) < Vj,out ≡ Vi,out
⇒ V ei,in(CEA, nh,in, nl,in) < Vi,out.
If the above inequality is satisﬁed, playing in at the beginning cannot be an optimal action for
agent i; a contradiction. Hence the result follows.
(CEL) The proof is similar to the proof for CEA. Suppose, by contradiction, that in equilibrium
there exists an agent i ∈ Nl who plays in whereas another agent j ∈ Nl plays out under CEL. We
denote the number of type h agents playing in as nh,in and the number of type l agents playing in
as nl,in. We consider two cases: (CEL - i) there is at least one agent k ∈ Nh who plays in (CEL -
ii) there is no agent k ∈ Nh who plays in.
(CEL - i) If there is at least one agent k ∈ Nh who plays in, Corollary 2, the equilibrium property
and our tie-breaking assumption imply that
Vi,out ≤ V ei,in(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) and
V ej,in(CEL, nh,in + 1, nl,in) < Vj,out.
Now assume that player j switches to in. The number of type l agents playing in is nl + 1 now.
The deﬁnition of CEL, the equilibrium property, and our tie-breaking assumption imply that
V ei,in(CEL, nh,in, nl,in + 1) = V
e
j,in(CEL, nh,in, nl,in + 1) < Vj,out ≡ Vi,out.
On the other hand, by Lemma 5,
Si(CEL, nh,in, nl,in + 1) > Si(CEL, nh,in, nl,in).
Hence,
V ei,in(CEL, nh,in, nl,in + 1) > V
e
i,in(CEL, nh,in, nl,in).
Therefore,
V ei,in(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) < V
e
i,in(CEL, nh,in, nl,in + 1) ≤ Vi,out
⇒ V ei,in(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) < Vi,out.
However, if the above inequality is satisﬁed playing in at the beginning cannot be an optimal action
for agent i; a contradiction. Hence the result follows.
(CEL - ii) If there is no agent k ∈ Nl who plays in under CEL in equilibrium (i.e., nl,in = 0), this
implies
Si(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) = 0 and
V ei,in(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) = P
e
i .
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However, this implies that P ei ≥ Vi,out. Hence, from (P) the result follows.
Now, suppose, by contradiction, that in equilibrium there exists an agent i ∈ Nh who plays in,
whereas another agent j ∈ Nh plays out. We consider two cases: (CEL - iii) there is at least one
agent k ∈ Nl who plays in (CEL - iv) there is no agent k ∈ Nl who plays in.
(CEL - iii) If there is at least one agent k ∈ Nl who plays in, by Corollary 2,
if ch > cl > λcel, Sl(CEL, in) =
nh
nh + nl
(r − rf )(wl − wh) and
if ch > λcel ≥ cl, Sl(CEL, in) = −(1 + rf )wl.
Hence, we know that
Sk(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) < 0 and
V ek,in(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) = P
e
k + Sk(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) ≥ Vk,out.
Now, assume that agent j switches to playing in. The deﬁnition of CEL, the equilibrium property
and our tie-breaking assumption imply that
V ej,in(CEL, nh,in + 1, nl,in) = V
e
i,in(CEL, nh,in + 1, nl,in) ≤ Vi,out ≡ Vj,out
where,
V ej,in(CEL, nh,in + 1, nl,in) = P
e
j + (1− πs)Sj(CEL, nh,in + 1, nl,in) and
Sj(CEL, nh,in + 1, nl,in) > 0.
However, if
V ek,in(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) = P
e
k + (1− πs)Sk(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) ≥ Vk,out
then by proportionality,
P ek ≥ Vk,out ⇔ P ej ≥ Vj,out
and by Corollary 2 and Lemma 5
Sk(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) < 0 and Sj(CEL, nh,in, nl,in + 1) > 0
leads to
V ej,in(CEL, nh,in, nl,in + 1) = V
e
i,in(CEL, nh,in, nl,in + 1) ≤ Vj,out,
which is a contradiction. Thus, if it is optimal for a type l agent to play in under CEL in
equilibrium, it cannot be optimal for any type h agent to play out in equilibrium, since any type h
agent will have non-negative transfers. Hence, the result follows.
(CEL - iv) If there is no agent k ∈ Nl who plays in under CEL in equilibrium (i.e., nl,in = 0),
this implies
Si(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) = 0 and
V ei,in(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) = P
e
i,in.
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Then if agent j switches to playing in, by Lemma 5,
Sk(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) > Sk(CEL, nh,in + 1, nl,in).
Then, there will still be no agent k ∈ Nl who plays in.Hence, the expected payoﬀs of type h agents
will not be aﬀected by the existence of other type h agents playing in, which implies
V ei,in(CEL, nh,in, nl,in) = V
e
j,in(CEL, nh,in + 1, nl,in)
= V ei,in(CEL, nh,in + 1, nl,in)
≤ Vj,out ≡ Vi,out.
If the inequality above is satisﬁed strictly, then playing in at the beginning cannot be an optimal
action for agent i; a contradiction. If it is satisﬁed, on the other hand, with equality, then it is not
optimal for agent j to play out at the beginning (due to the tie-breaking rule) which is again a
contradiction. Hence the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 8. (i) By Corollary 2, Sl(CEA, in) > 0 and Sh(CEA, in) < 0. Therefore, if
type l agents (who are favored by CEA) play out, this implies that
V el (CEA, in) = P
e
l + (1− πs)Sl(CEA, in) < Vl,out.
Since Sl(CEA, in) > 0, this implies that P el < Vl,out. Using proportionality, P
e
l < Vl,out if and only
if P eh < Vh,out. However, we know that Sh(CEA, in) < 0. Therefore,
V eh (CEA, in) = P
e
h + (1− πs)Sh(CEA, in) > Vh,out
cannot hold. Hence, this implies that playing in cannot be optimal for type h agents (who are
disfavored by CEA), if it is not optimal for type l agents.
(ii) By Corollary 2, Sh(CEL, in) > 0 and Sl(CEL, in) < 0. Therefore, if type h agents (who are
favored by CEL) play out, this implies that
V eh (CEL, in) = P
e
h + (1− πs)Sh(CEL, in) < Vh,out.
Since Sh(CEL, in) > 0, this implies that P eh < Vh,out. Using proportionality, P
e
h < Vh,out if and
only if P el < Vl,out. However, we know that Sl(CEL, in) < 0. Therefore,
V el (CEL, in) = P
e
l + (1− πs)Sl(CEL, in) > Vl,out
cannot hold. Hence, this implies that playing in cannot be optimal for type l agents (who are
disfavored by CEL), if it is not optimal for type h agents.
C - Multiple Companies and Competition
Characterization of All Nash Equilibria in All Subgames:
In this appendix, we ﬁrst characterize the Nash equilibria of all subgames. Since there are two
companies moving sequentially and there are three possible bankruptcy rules that can be chosen,
there are nine subgames for the agents to play. The following results are used in the characterization
52
of all subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the whole game. Also note that every equilibria mentioned
below are essentially unique.
ΓFm,Fm = ΓP,P
If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et ≥ Vt,out, then both type l and h agents invest in a company, in equilibrium.
It’s a dominant strategy to do so since under P , what others do does not aﬀect agent’s payoﬀ.
Therefore, by assumption 2, half of nh and half of nl invest in m and the other halves in m, in
equilibrium. Therefore, Vm = Vm = (nhwh + nlwl)/2.
If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et < Vt,out, then no agent invests in a company, in equilibrium. Therefore,
Vm = Vm = 0.
ΓFm,Fm = ΓP,CEA
If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et ≥ Vt,out, then both type l and h agents invest in a company, in equilibrium.
Note that CEA is always at least weakly better for type l agents and P is always at least weakly
better for type h agents.18 Hence, by assumption 1, type l agents invest in m and type h agents
invest in m, in equilibrium. Therefore, Vm = nhwh and Vm = nlwl.
If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et < Vt,out, then no agent invests in a company, in equilibrium. Therefore,
Vm = Vm = 0.
ΓFm,Fm = ΓP,CEL
If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et ≥ Vt,out, then both type l and h agents invest in a company, in equilibrium.
Note that CEL is always at least weakly better for type h agents and P is always at least weakly
better for type l agents.19 Hence, by assumption 1, type h agents invest in m and type l agents
invest in m, in equilibrium. Therefore, Vm = nlwl and Vm = nhwh.
If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et < Vt,out, then no agent invests in a company, in equilibrium. Therefore,
Vm = Vm = 0.
ΓFm,Fm = ΓCEA,P
The analysis in this case is same with the one in ΓP,CEA and hence omitted. Only diﬀerence is
that when for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et ≥ Vt,out, type l agents invest in m and type h agents invest in m,
in equilibrium. Therefore, now Vm = nlwl and Vm = nhwh.
ΓFm,Fm = ΓCEA,CEA
If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et ≥ Vt,out and P eh + (1− πs)Sh(CEA, in) ≥ Vh,out, then both type l and h
agents invest in a company, in equilibrium.20 Since both companies use CEA, agents are indiﬀerent
between them. Hence, by assumption 2, half of each type invest in m and the other halves invest
in m, in equilibrium. Therefore, Vm = Vm = (nhwh + nlwl)/2.
If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et ≥ Vt,out and P eh + (1− πs)Sh(CEA, in) < Vh,out, then only type l agents
invest in a company, in equilibrium. Playing in is a weakly dominant strategy for type l agents
when CEA is chosen by companies and given that, the best response of type h agents is to play out.
18Note that if CEL was chosen by one of the companies, it would always be at least weakly better for type h
agents. But in the presence of P and CEA, P is the weakly better choice for type h agents.
19Note that if CEA was chosen by one of the companies, it would always be at least weakly better for type l agents.
But in the presence of P and CEL, P is the weakly better choice for type l agents.
20Note that Sh(CEA, in) in the inequality refers to the per-capita transfer a type h agent would make if nh/2 type
h agents and nl/2 type l agents invested in a company that has chosen CEA. But this is equal to the per-capita
transfer a type h agent would make if nh type h agents and nl type l agents invested in that company. Hence, we
kept the original notation.
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Since both companies use CEA, type l agents are indiﬀerent between them. Hence, by assumption
2, half of type l agents invest in m and the other half invest in m, in equilibrium. Therefore,
Vm = Vm = nlwl/2.
If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et < Vt,out, then no agent invests in a company, in equilibrium. Therefore,
Vm = Vm = 0.
ΓFm,Fm = ΓCEA,CEL
If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et ≥ Vt,out, then both type l and h agents invest in a company. Note that
CEL is always at least weakly better for type h agents and CEA is always at least weakly better
for type l agents. Hence, by assumption 1, type l agents invest in m and type h agents invest in
m, in equilibrium. Thus, Vm = nhwh and Vm = nlwl.
If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et < Vt,out, then no agent invests in a company, in equilibrium. Therefore,
Vm = Vm = 0.
ΓFm,Fm = ΓCEL,P
The analysis in this case is same with the one in ΓP,CEL and hence omitted. Only diﬀerence is
that when for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et ≥ Vt,out, type l agents invest in m and type h agents invest in m,
in equilibrium. Therefore, Vm = nhwh and Vm = nlwl.
ΓFm,Fm = ΓCEL,CEA
The analysis in this case is same with the one in ΓCEA,CEL and hence omitted. Only diﬀerence
is that when for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et ≥ Vt,out, type l agents invest in m and type h agents invest in m,
in equilibrium. Therefore, Vm = nhwh and Vm = nlwl.
ΓFm,Fm = ΓCEL,CEL
If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et ≥ Vt,out and P el + (1− πs)Sl(CEL, in) ≥ Vl,out, then both type l and h
agents invest in a company, in equilbrium. Since both companies use CEL, agents are indiﬀerent
between them. Hence, by assumption 2, half of each type invest in m and other halves invest in m,
in equilibrium. Therefore, Vm = Vm = (nhwh + nlwl)/2.
If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et ≥ Vt,out and P el + (1− πs)Sl(CEL, in) < Vl,out, then only type h agents
invest in a company. Playing in is a weakly dominant strategy for type h agents when CEL is chosen
by companies and given that, the best response of type l agents is to play out. Since both companies
use CEL, type h agents are indiﬀerent between them. Hence, by assumption 2, half of type h agents
invest in m and other halves invest in m, in equilibrium. Therefore, Vm = Vm = nhwh/2.
If for all t ∈ {l, h}, P et < Vt,out, then no agent invests in a company, in equilibrium. Therefore,
Vm = Vm = 0.
Characterization of All Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria:
In this part, we characterize all subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the extended model with
two companies by using the results in the previous part. Since representation of equilibria with
strategies of all players becomes reader unfriendly (due to the fact that there are three subgames
for m and nine subgames for agents), we mention only the subgame perfect equilibrium actions and
resulting outcomes in this part.
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C1. If for all t ∈ {l, h}
P et ≥ Vt,out,
P eh + (1− πs)Sh(CEA, in) < Vh,out, and
P el + (1− πs)Sl(CEL, in) < Vl,out,
C1.1. nhwh > nlwl
C1.1.1. nhwh/2 < nlwl: Since type h agents hold, in total, a larger amount of money and m ﬁnds
it better to attract type l agents instead of sharing type h agents (since nhwh/2 < nlwl), m
choosing CEL and m choosing either CEA or P are best responses to each other. Moreover,
we know from our analysis above that both in ΓCEL,P and ΓCEL,CEA, type h agents invest
in m and type l agents invest in m in equilibrium under the conditions given by C1. Thus,
in both subgame perfect Nash equilibria, Vm = nhwh and Vm = nlwl.
C1.1.2. nhwh/2 ≥ nlwl: Since type h agents hold, in total, a larger amount of money and m ﬁnds it
better to share type h agents than attracting type l agents (since nhwh/2 ≥ nlwl), m and m
both choosing CEL are best responses to each other. Moreover, we know from our analysis
above that in ΓCEL,CEL, a half of type h agents invest in m and the other half invest in m
whereas type l agents do not invest in any company in equilibrium under the conditions given
by C1. Thus, in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, Vm = Vm = nhwh/2.
C1.2. nlwl > nhwh
C1.2.1. nlwl/2 < nhwh: Since type l agents hold, in total, a larger amount of money and m ﬁnds
it better to attract type h agents instead of sharing type l agents (since nlwl/2 < nhwh), m
choosing CEA and m choosing either CEL or P are best responses to each other. Moreover,
we know from our analysis above that both in ΓCEA,P and ΓCEA,CEL, type l agents invest in
m and type h agents invest in m in equilibrium under the conditions given by C1. Thus, in
both subgame perfect Nash equilibria, Vm = nlwl and Vm = nhwh.
C1.2.2. nlwl/2 ≥ nhwh: Since type l agents hold, in total, a larger amount of money and m ﬁnds it
better to share type l agents than attracting type h agents (since nlwl/2 ≥ nhwh), m and m
both choosing CEA are best responses to each other. Moreover, we know from our analysis
above that in ΓCEA,CEA, a half of type l agents invest in m and the other half invest in m
whereas type h agents do not invest in any company in equilibrium under the conditions given
by C1. Thus, in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, Vm = Vm = nlwl/2.
C1.3. nhwh = nlwl: Given the income equality between two groups,m is indiﬀerent between P,CEA
and CEL. m’s best response to m playing P is playing any one of the three rules; its best
response to m playing CEA is either playing P or CEL; and its best response to m playing
CEL is either playing P or CEA. Hence, any combination of rules except (CEA,CEA) and
(CEL,CEL) belongs to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we know from our
analysis above, in ΓP,P a half of each type of agent invests in m and the other halves invests
in m. In ΓCEL,P and ΓCEL,CEA, type h agents invest in m and type l agents invest in m; in
ΓCEA,P and ΓCEA,CEL, type l agents invest in m and type h agents invest in m. In ΓP,CEA,
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type h agents invest in m and type l agents invest in m and in ΓP,CEL, type l agents invest
in m and type h agents invest in m.
C2. If for all t ∈ {l, h},
P et ≥ Vt,out,
P eh + (1− πs)Sh(CEA, in) ≥ Vh,out, and
P el + (1− πs)Sl(CEL, in) < Vl,out,
C2.1. nhwh > nlwl
C2.1.1. nhwh/2 < nlwl: The analysis is similar to the one in C1.1.1 and hence omitted.
C2.1.2. nhwh/2 ≥ nlwl: The analysis is similar to the one in C1.1.2 and hence omitted.
C2.2. nlwl ≥ nhwh: Since type l agents hold, in total, a larger amount of money and m ﬁnds it
better to share the whole market than attracting only type h agents (since nlwl ≥ nhwh =⇒
(nhwh + nlwl)/2 ≥ nhwh), m and m both choosing CEA are best responses to each other.
Moreover, we know from our analysis above that in ΓCEA,CEA, a half of each type of agents
invest in m and the other half invest in m in equilibrium under the conditions given by C2.
Thus, in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, Vm = Vm = (nhwh + nlwl)/2.
C2.3. nhwh = nlwl: The analysis similar to the one in C1.3 and hence omitted. The only diﬀerence
is that any combination of rules except (CEL,CEL) belongs to a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.
C3. If for all t ∈ {l, h},
P et ≥ Vt,out,
P eh + (1− πs)Sh(CEA, in) < Vh,out, and
P el + (1− πs)Sl(CEL, in) ≥ Vl,out,
C3.1. nhwh ≥ nlwl: Since type h agents hold, in total, a larger amount of money and m ﬁnds it
better to share the whole market than attracting only type l agents (since nhwh ≥ nlwl =⇒
(nhwh + nlwl)/2 ≥ nlwl), m and m both choosing CEL are best responses to each other.
Moreover, we know from our analysis above that in ΓCEL,CEL, half of each type of agents
invest in m and the other half invest in m in equilibrium under the conditions given by C3.
Thus, in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, Vm = Vm = (nhwh + nlwl)/2.
C3.2. nlwl > nhwh
C3.2.1. nlwl/2 < nhwh: The analysis is similar to the one in C1.2.1 and hence omitted.
C3.2.2. nlwl/2 ≥ nhwh: The analysis is similar to the one in C1.2.2 and hence omitted.
C3.3. nhwh = nlwl: The analysis is similar to the one in C1.3 and hence omitted. The only
diﬀerence is that any combination of rules except (CEA,CEA) belongs to a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium.
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C4. If for all t ∈ {l, h},
P et ≥ Vt,out,
P eh + (1− πs)Sh(CEA, in) ≥ Vh,out, and
P el + (1− πs)Sl(CEL, in) ≥ Vl,out,
C4.1. nhwh > nlwl: Since type h agents hold, in total, a larger amount of money and m ﬁnds it
better to share the whole market than attracting only type l agents (since nhwh ≥ nlwl =⇒
(nhwh + nlwl)/2 ≥ nlwl), m and m both choosing CEL are best responses to each other.
Moreover, we know from our analysis above that in ΓCEL,CEL, a half of each type of agents
invest in m and the other half invest in m in equilibrium under the conditions given by C4.
Thus, in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, Vm = Vm = (nhwh + nlwl)/2.
C4.2. nlwl > nhwh: Since type l agents hold, in total, a larger amount of money and m ﬁnds it
better to share the whole market than attracting only type h agents (since nlwl ≥ nhwh =⇒
(nhwh + nlwl)/2 ≥ nhwh), m and m both choosing CEA are best responses to each other.
Moreover, we know from our analysis above that in ΓCEA,CEA, a half of each type of agents
invest in m and the other half invest in m in equilibrium under the conditions given by C4.
Thus, in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, Vm = Vm = (nhwh + nlwl)/2.
C4.3. nhwh = nlwl: Any combination of rules belongs to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under
the conditions given by C4. In all of these equilibria, both type l and h agents invest in a
company.
C5. If for all t ∈ {l, h},
P et < Vt,out,
Any combination of rules belongs to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In none of these
equilibria, agents invest in a company.
The comparative statics in the following appendix sections are used in obtaining the results in
Section 6.
D - Comparative Static Analyses on nl, wl, nh and wh
Sceah S
cea
l
ch > λcea ≥ cl ch > cl ≥ λcea ch > λcea ≥ cl ch > cl ≥ λcea
nl − − 0 −
nh + + 0 +
wl − + + −
wh 0 − 0 +
Table D1: The Eﬀect of Changes in nl, nh, wl and wh on Sceat
Scelh S
cel
l
ch > cl > λcel ch > λcel ≥ cl ch > cl > λcel ch > λcel ≥ cl
nl + + + 0
nh − − − 0
wl − + + −
wh + 0 − 0
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Table D2: The Eﬀect of Changes in nl, nh, wl and wh on Scelt
E - Comparative static analyses on r and rf
Sceah S
cea
l
ch > λcea ≥ cl ch > cl ≥ λcea ch > λcea ≥ cl ch > cl ≥ λcea
r − 0 + 0
rf + − − +
Table E1: The Eﬀect of Changes in r and rf on Sceat
Scelh S
cel
l
ch > cl > λcel ch > λcel ≥ cl ch > cl > λcel ch > λcel ≥ cl
r + 0 − 0
rf − + + −
Table E2: The Eﬀect of Changes in r and rf on Scelt
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